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Introduction
Economists have been observing cross-border flows of goods, capital, and
people for decades. Yet the last period of economic integration is charac-
terized by one distinguishing feature: the rise of multinational enterprises
(see Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004; OECD, 2007).
The very fact that these firms are active at many locations presents new
challenges for policymakers. Indeed, if companies operate on an increasingly
global basis, they find it easier not only to shift real economic activities but
also taxable profits across national boundaries.1 Since profits are still taxed
on a national basis, profit shifting renders national tax systems obsolete,
because it affects the ability of governments to raise corporate tax revenue
and implies a change in the tax response of firms in terms of investment and
location decisions.
As corporate tax rates vary considerably across countries, multinational en-
terprises can take advantage of international tax-rate differences. Figure 1
1The empirical literature on the impact of corporate taxation on multinational enter-
prises has shown that national tax levels can make a significant difference, on the one
hand, to where business is done (e.g., De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003); and on the other
hand, to where profits are reported (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven, 2008).
x
Introduction xi
depicts the distribution of the mean statutory corporate tax rate over 167
countries.2 While some low-tax or tax-haven countries have zero tax rates
on corporate income (e.g., the Cayman Islands or the Bahamas), high-tax
countries claim almost half of corporate profits. Although the German cor-
porate income tax rate (inclusive of local business taxes) has been cut in
several steps from 57.25% to 39.43%, on average, Germany is still among the
high-tax locations. At the top end of the tax-rate distribution we observe
Sudan with a mean statutory tax rate of almost 50%.3
If foreign investments or taxable profits are sensitive to taxation, the conse-
quence may be that countries compete in statutory tax rates. The presump-
tion is that this competition ultimately leads to a ‘race to the bottom’, where
corporate tax rates converge to zero.4 Although this has not been true so far,
as Figure 2 demonstrates, there is a downward trend as the average statutory
tax rate (over all 167 countries) came down from 32.86% in 1996 to 27.65% in
2005. However, in some countries, tax competition is more pronounced than
in others. For instance, the average corporate tax rate in Eastern European
countries declined from 32.2% in 1996 to 19.2% in 2005.
2The mean statutory tax rates refer to the period from 1996 to 2005, as this is the time
span for which firm-level data is available (see below).
3Mean statutory tax rates are also displayed in Table 1. Since German multinationals
either do not have foreign investments in all 167 countries or the number of investments
is not significantly high (data confidentiality), the table may not contain all 167 countries
from Figure 1.
4Tax competition models predict that governments engage in wasteful competition for
mobile capital (see Wilson, 1999) or taxable profits (see Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000) in
statutory tax rates.
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Introduction xiv
This dissertation consists of four self-contained essays in public economics.
Each of the essays aims at contributing to the understanding of the effects of
corporate taxation on the activities of multinational enterprises, with an em-
phasis placed on issues related to the capital structure choice of multination-
als. All empirical investigations are based on the Microdatabase Direct In-
vestment (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (see Lipponer, 2007,
for an overview). This is a comprehensive dataset recording foreign direct
investment (FDI) stocks of non-residents in Germany (inbound investment)
and of residents in foreign economic territories (outbound investment). The
current version is available as panel data from 1996 to 2005. One remarkable
aspect of MiDi is that multinational enterprises are subject to mandatory
reporting to the Bundesbank if investments exceed certain thresholds – in
terms of an affiliate’s balance-sheet total and the parent’s ownership share.
Therefore, we virtually observe all FDI activities of German multinationals
as well as foreign FDI in Germany. Table 1, hence, displays the universe of
foreign activities of German multinationals, thereby revealing the structure
of German outbound FDI with regard to its geographical distribution. By
far the most important host country, in terms of total and fixed assets, is
the USA. As expected, European countries are also very important (e.g., the
United Kingdom, France, Austria, or Italy). Considering ‘Total Assets’, the
particular relevance of the Cayman Islands (as a tax-haven location), the
Netherlands (as a location for holding companies), and Luxembourg (as a
location for financial services) is highlighted. If we take into account ‘Fixed
Assets’ as a measure for productive economic activity, however, these coun-
tries are of no particular importance. Finally, the last column reports the
Introduction xv
mean statutory corporate tax rate of the countries (also displayed in Fig-
ure 1).
The first chapter of this dissertation investigates how taxes affect the affiliate-
level investment decision of German multinationals, taking into account that
a significant share of outbound investments are indirect rather than direct.
While we consider direct investments as simple bilateral structures, where a
parent firm is investing in a foreign affiliate; indirect structures involve at
least three corporate entities, where the parent is investing via an interme-
diate entity in a foreign affiliate. The novel feature of this investigation is
that it explicitly makes a distinction between direct and indirect investments,
because an indirect structure possibly opens up enhanced opportunities for
multinationals to avoid taxes. As a consequence, the role of corporate tax-
ation in destination countries may change in case of an indirect investment.
The empirical analysis, addressing endogeneity issues by using a switching
regression model, confirms theoretical predictions: while direct investments
are negatively affected by the host country’s statutory tax rate, indirect in-
vestments are positively related to the statutory tax rate in host countries.
This latter result is surprising, but it can be explained by an additional in-
terest deduction associated with the indirect financing structure. However,
if we consider cost of capital terms obtained from the theoretical analysis, we
find negative effects on affiliate investment for both structures. The results
carry an important implication for tax competition: the existence of conduit
entities and low-tax conduit countries reduces the downward pressure on
statutory tax rates. At the same time, though, competition for intermediate
entities, i.e. competition in preferential tax treatments, may be intensified.
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Table 1: German Outbound FDI
Total Assets Total Assets Fixed Assets Number of Corporate
Country (in 1,000 e) (Rank) (in 1,000 e) Affiliates Tax Rate
Algeria 116,995 87 67,441 4.20 0.324
Argentina 5,047,181 35 1,147,443 138.20 0.341
Australia 36,484,335 16 2,238,863 343.30 0.334
Austria 125,400,000 7 10,072,729 1,437.50 0.331
Bahamas 108,186 88 42,465 5.10 0.000
Bahrain 97,619 89 3,800 3.30 0.000
Bangladesh 22,554 105 1,847 3.70 0.350
Barbados 1,112,555 52 153 5.10 0.380
Belarus 23,049 104 13,058 4.30 0.278
Belgium 70,303,960 11 5,753,960 713.00 0.383
Bermuda 2,508,727 45 74,829 15.90 0.000
Bolivia 56,292 94 9,370 4.90 0.250
Bosnia-Herz. 328,881 69 71,651 11.78 ——
Brazil 21,132,588 22 5,220,800 402.30 0.323
Brit. Virg. Isl. 224,000 76 8,144 7.10 0.135
Bulgaria 1,358,859 50 448,461 48.70 0.293
Canada 36,065,845 17 6,300,146 405.20 0.413
Canary Isl. 251,982 74 148,009 24.00 0.350
Cayman Isl. 142,200,000 5 196,659 56.00 0.000
Chile 1,365,030 49 193,132 66.10 0.156
China 14,304,017 27 4,877,777 455.50 0.330
Columbia 986,321 55 417,023 41.90 0.350
Costa Rica 93,016 91 22,502 12.50 0.300
Coˆte d’Ivoire 43,637 96 5,265 4.70 0.350
Croatia 3,199,476 41 1,029,772 57.30 0.265
Cyprus 531,004 62 116,991 37.20 0.215
Czech Rep. 24,221,518 19 8,399,625 808.40 0.326
Denmark 13,234,181 28 1,332,277 325.50 0.312
Domin. Rep. 51,046 95 20,669 9.20 0.250
Ecuador 175,214 81 47,297 17.30 0.315
Egypt 473,938 65 133,919 25.60 0.400
El Salvador 95,851 90 22,891 6.70 0.250
Estonia 176,958 80 59,689 21.90 0.258
Finland 2,966,741 43 1,119,198 123.50 0.283
France 140,100,000 6 13,092,047 2,174.80 0.369
Georgia 12,408 108 1,612 4.29 0.200
Ghana 24,793 102 6,864 4.78 0.333
Source: MiDi, Deutsche Bundesbank (1996 – 2005). All countries where less than 3 investments are
observed are removed because of confidentiality reasons. ‘Total Assets’ is the sum of the balance-sheet
total of foreign affiliates; ‘Fixed Assets’ is the sum of the balance-sheet item reporting the fixed assets of
foreign affiliates; ‘Corporate Tax Rate’ is the unweighted statutory tax rate on corporate profits. Columns
2, 4, 5, and 6 refer to mean values.
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Table 1: German Outbound FDI, cont.
Total Assets Total Assets Fixed Assets Number of Corporate
Country (in 1,000 e) (Rank) (in 1,000 e) Affiliates Tax Rate
Gibraltar 153,305 83 38,932 4.20 0.350
Greece 3,818,674 38 639,451 125.80 0.347
Guatemala 151,338 84 27,473 13.30 0.298
Guernsey 14,950,590 26 4,228 9.00 0.200
Honduras 21,419 106 7,263 4.30 0.296
Hong Kong 62,226,811 13 469,166 295.20 0.165
Hungary 21,795,837 21 6,667,901 608.80 0.193
India 4,158,093 37 717,253 146.70 0.369
Indonesia 2,777,715 44 675,942 72.30 0.300
Iran 88,946 92 18,655 11.30 0.453
Ireland 85,771,940 10 961,723 228.40 0.108
Isle of Man 324,125 70 86,517 14.00 0.100
Israel 257,320 72 39,776 19.70 0.358
Italy 100,100,000 9 9,058,002 1,142.30 0.423
Japan 103,000,000 8 4,268,239 309.70 0.453
Jersey 16,448,560 24 17,988 24.67 0.200
Kazakhstan 43,229 98 18,209 5.10 0.300
Kenya 72,516 93 9,939 12.20 0.318
Korea (South) 8,678,239 31 1,505,868 121.00 0.299
Latvia 479,133 63 79,148 28.70 0.221
Lebanon 10,569 109 964 3.90 0.125
Liberia 192,578 77 60,654 9.20 —–
Libya 645,891 59 319,614 7.50 0.460
Liechtenstein 474,311 64 73,938 15.20 0.200
Lithuania 567,075 60 6,629 29.20 0.224
Luxembourg 324,700,000 3 3,317,432 269.60 0.351
Macedonia 396,492 66 128,047 5.20 0.150
Malaysia 5,226,932 34 1,238,460 150.30 0.284
Malta 1,056,003 54 69,367 21.50 0.350
Mauritius 544,713 61 22,361 7.00 0.300
Mexico 15,153,405 25 5,094,547 226.70 0.339
Moldova 31,042 99 16,075 3.11 0.226
Morocco 249,240 75 74,196 24.40 0.350
Namibia 26,734 100 6,641 5.20 0.350
Netherlands 232,400,000 4 7,041,790 1,343.60 0.345
Netherl. Antil. 20,546,803 23 3,179 15.60 0.363
New Zealand 8,254,009 32 106,797 63.30 0.330
Source: MiDi, Deutsche Bundesbank (1996 – 2005). All countries where less than 3 investments are
observed are removed because of confidentiality reasons. ‘Total Assets’ is the sum of the balance-sheet
total of foreign affiliates; ‘Fixed Assets’ is the sum of the balance-sheet item reporting the fixed assets of
foreign affiliates; ‘Corporate Tax Rate’ is the unweighted statutory tax rate on corporate profits. Columns
2, 4, 5, and 6 refer to mean values.
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Table 1: German Outbound FDI, cont.
Total Assets Total Assets Fixed Assets Number of Corporate
Country (in 1,000 e) (Rank) (in 1,000 e) Affiliates Tax Rate
Nicaragua 24,320 103 1,874 3.50 0.285
Nigeria 130,835 86 22,291 7.80 0.300
Norway 3,604,787 40 1,050,040 159.60 0.280
Oman 25,221 101 3,031 4.00 0.250
Pakistan 682,528 58 324,663 14.60 0.356
Panama 1,396,344 48 25,102 15.20 0.342
Paraguay 43,405 97 12,645 8.20 0.300
Peru 253,841 73 68,427 24.70 0.294
Philippines 962,754 57 164,346 50.50 0.329
Poland 25,048,498 18 6,051,136 908.90 0.299
Portugal 12,076,587 29 2,000,761 260.60 0.319
Romania 1,719,392 47 744,831 107.80 0.293
Russia 3,782,115 39 1,117,871 156.00 0.301
Saudi Arabia 167,876 82 14,470 10.20 0.355
Singapore 62,453,260 12 1,466,239 306.10 0.245
Slovak Rep. 5,793,021 33 2,603,507 189.40 0.306
Slovenia 1,317,628 51 259,794 64.50 0.250
South Africa 8,852,513 30 1,220,037 277.10 0.393
Spain 52,494,195 14 9,660,651 1,035.70 0.350
Sri Lanka 138,446 85 10,137 6.90 0.355
Sweden 22,692,875 20 2,828,143 395.50 0.280
Switzerland 50,256,958 15 5,749,394 1,288.80 0.245
Taiwan 2,153,280 46 195,853 78.60 0.250
Tanzania 10,481 110 1,485 4.10 0.310
Thailand 2,984,257 42 521,654 80.20 0.300
Tunisia 192,112 79 103,095 30.70 0.346
Turkey 4,406,224 36 1,715,605 165.60 0.360
UK 957,500,000 2 23,899,172 1,783.20 0.307
Ukraine 1,058,247 53 479,248 38.80 0.290
Unit. Arab E. 370,099 68 53,367 29.70 0.333
Uruguay 304,150 71 43,349 22.00 0.310
USA 1,167,000,000 1 115,000,000 2,561.70 0.411
Venezuela 964,261 56 302,407 41.50 0.340
Vietnam 192,499 78 37,623 12.30 0.310
Yugoslavia 376,785 67 119,227 11.60 0.203
Zimbabwe 16,250 107 8,140 4.00 0.338
Source: MiDi, Deutsche Bundesbank (1996 – 2005). All countries where less than 3 investments are
observed are removed because of confidentiality reasons. ‘Total Assets’ is the sum of the balance-sheet
total of foreign affiliates; ‘Fixed Assets’ is the sum of the balance-sheet item reporting the fixed assets
of foreign affiliates; ‘Corporate Tax Rate’ is the unweighted statutory tax rate on corporate profits.
Columns 2, 4, 5, and 6 refer to mean values.
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The second chapter investigates tax-planning behavior of multinational firms
by means of internal debt finance and the effectiveness of countermeasures
via thin-capitalization rules. Such rules, which have become increasingly
popular among governments to restrict multinationals’ profit shifting, limit
the deductibility of interest expenses associated with internal debt. A simple
theoretical model which considers the financing decision of a multinational
firm is used to obtain empirical implications. While the empirical analysis in
Chapter 1 is based on outbound investment data, in Chapter 2 we change the
perspective and employ German inbound investment data. The investigation
confirms a significant impact of bilateral tax-rate differentials on the use of
internal debt provided by foreign investors to the German subsidiaries. To
test the impact of the German thin-capitalization rule (Sec. 8a KStG), we
exploit the 2001 and 2004 amendments to the German corporate income tax
law concerning the thin-capitalization rule. Both amendments had differ-
ential effects on foreign subsidiaries belonging to different company groups.
This allows us to apply a difference-in-differences estimator to identify the
effect of the rule. The results suggest that thin-capitalization restrictions are
effective and induce significantly lower internal-debt-to-capital ratios.
Another behavioral response of multinational firms concerning thin-capita-
lization rules is investigated in the third chapter. However, while the focus
in Chapter 2 is on multinationals’ response with respect to internal debt,
Chapter 3 goes beyond this analysis and examines the multinationals’ re-
sponse with respect to external debt. If multinational enterprises are able to
substitute external for internal debt, the goal of governments, i.e. to secure
the domestic corporate tax base by using thin-capitalization rules, possibly
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fails, because such rules usually do not restrict the interest deduction as-
sociated with external debt. To address the basic problem of identifying
the causal effect of thin-capitalization rules on external debt, the paper ex-
ploits the 2001 reform of the German thin-capitalization rule and applies
propensity score matching techniques. The results of the study suggest that
a tighter restriction on the deductibility of interest expenses for internal debt
comes along with an expansion in external debt finance. This novel finding
emphasizes the mobility of multinationals with respect to avoiding taxes.
This mobility should be considered by policymakers, because otherwise any
attempt to restrict profit shifting fails.
Chapter 4, finally, investigates the determinants of internal debt issued by
foreign affiliates of multinational corporations. It contributes to the literature
by analyzing the capital structure choice in a setting where internal debt can
be used to shift profits to low-tax countries. In contrast to existing research,
the theoretical analysis distinguishes between internal debt to minimize cost
of capital across capital markets, and internal debt to shift taxable profits.
The model yields the prediction that internal debt to minimize cost of capital
is determined by the host country’s statutory tax rate. Internal debt to shift
profits, however, is determined by the tax-rate differential within the multi-
national group. The empirical analysis, which exploits differences in taxing
conditions of 175 countries over a period of 10 years, confirms a robust and
significant positive impact of tax-rate differences within the company group
on the use of internal debt, supporting the view that internal debt is used to
shift profits. Yet the host country’s statutory tax rate is insignificant, indi-
cating that internal debt is not used to minimize cost of capital. The results
Introduction xxi
prove robust if we take into account the potential effect of the German Con-
trolled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rule (Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung), which
aims at preventing profit shifting. However, the tax effects are rather small,
even if we focus on majority-owned subsidiaries, suggesting that costs related
to adjusting the capital structure are substantial. If profit shifting is impor-
tant, as existing studies demonstrate, the findings imply that other channels
to shift income, e.g. transfer pricing, are extensively used by multinational
enterprises.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of corporate taxation with respect to a
multinational’s investment decision in which the multinational can pursue ei-
ther a direct or an indirect investment strategy. The latter strategy involves
an intermediate corporate entity and opens up enhanced opportunities for
international tax planning. The existence of preferential tax treatment for
intermediate entities presumably changes the role of corporate taxation in
destination countries, because it supports multinationals in avoiding taxes.
The empirical findings of this study are consistent with theoretical predic-
tions and suggest that tax effects differ, depending on the investment regime.
The endogeneity of the regime choice – direct versus indirect – is taken into
account by a switching regression approach.
1.1 Introduction
Economists agree that corporate taxation influences both the location choice
and the investment decision of multinational firms (see Gresik, 2001; De
Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). However, as companies become ever more inter-
national, another aspect is that multinational enterprises also find it increas-
ingly easier to shift profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions (see Hines,
1999; Devereux and Maffini, 2007). Differences in national tax systems and
the complexity of the international tax law open up additional opportunities
to avoid taxes. This implies that multinationals may establish sophisticated
firm structures to exploit tax-avoidance opportunities.
In this paper we analyze how taxes affect the affiliate-level investment deci-
sion of German multinationals, taking into account that a significant share
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of outbound investments are indirect rather than direct. While we consider
direct investments as simple bilateral structures, where a parent company
is directly investing in a foreign affiliate; indirect strategies involve at least
three corporate entities, where the parent is investing via an intermediate or
conduit entity in another foreign enterprise (see Weichenrieder and Mintz,
2008). Indirect investment structures possibly support multinationals in re-
ducing corporate tax liabilities on a worldwide basis, because profits can be
shifted from high- to low-tax (or even zero-tax) conduit locations. Moreover,
tax-efficient indirect financing structures allow payments to be channeled
from affiliates to parent companies, possibly without any tax deduction. As
a consequence, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may
change.
Mintz (2004) demonstrates in a theoretical model that the analysis of invest-
ment decisions made by multinationals should explicitly differ between direct
and indirect investments. In contrast to the existing empirical literature,
this paper follows this structural distinction and empirically confirms that
tax effects differ: while direct investments are negatively affected by foreign
statutory tax rates, indirect investments are positively related to statutory
tax rates in host countries. If we follow theoretical predictions and control
for the tax-related cost of capital, we find adverse effects on affiliate-level
investment for both structures. The potential endogeneity of the structural
choice (direct versus indirect) is taken into account by a switching regression
approach. The empirical investigation is based on the Microdatabase Direct
Investment (MiDi), a comprehensive dataset of all German outbound invest-
ment positions provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (the German Central
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Bank; see Lipponer, 2007). The current version is available from 1996 to
2005 and contains data on companies’ balance sheets as well as some further
information, e.g. whether the investment is held directly or indirectly.
The novel empirical findings of this paper carry an important policy impli-
cation: the existence of conduit entities and low-tax conduit countries will
lead to less aggressive international tax competition over statutory tax rates.
Conversely, if tax discrimination in terms of preferential tax treatment for
the conduit entities is reduced, tax competition is intensified (see Keen, 2001;
Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a general overview of
direct and indirect investment structures, including some descriptive statis-
tics. In Section 1.3, we set up a model that distinguishes between direct and
indirect investments. Section 1.4 proposes an empirical estimation approach.
Subsequently, Section 1.5 provides information about the data. Section 1.6
presents the empirical results. Section 1.7 examines the sensitivity of the
results. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Direct versus Indirect Investments
While the majority of foreign investments are direct, a considerable propor-
tion of multinational outbound activities are indirect (see below). Figure 1.1
shows a stylized model which points out that German multinationals can, in
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Figure 1.1: Direct versus Indirect Investment
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principle, follow both investment regimes. Either the multinational decides
to invest directly in the destination country F or it chooses an indirect struc-
ture and establishes a conduit entity, possibly in a third country C.1 The
choice of this organizational structure is presumably not random; it may de-
pend on destination-country characteristics, firm preferences or strategies, as
well as on the company-specific potential.
Figure 1.2 presents the annual number of German outbound investments from
1996 to 2005. There has been a significant increase in the number of invest-
ment objects in both regimes. Moreover, focusing on indirect observations,
the left graph of Figure 1.3 shows the three most important conduit locations
for German multinationals. The Netherlands attract more than a fourth of
1We mostly refer to ‘conduit’ entities. This emphasizes that these entities connect
German parent firms to foreign subsidiaries in destination countries. Alternatively, we
may refer to intermediate or holding companies.
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German conduit entities. Together with Switzerland and Austria, these three
countries host almost 60% of all German conduit entities. The right-hand
side of Figure 1.3 displays the three most important destination countries
for indirect structures. Here, observations are more evenly distributed across
countries: about one-fifth of German indirect outbound investment goes to
Italy, France, and Spain.2
While this paper argues that differences in international taxation can explain
why indirect structures exist, the classical case of an indirect entity may be
associated with non-tax reasons. Indeed, headquarters or holding companies
may provide services which it is useful to bundle centrally for legal or effi-
ciency reasons. With regard to taxation, Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008)
identify three potential roles of conduit entities. First, a conduit entity can
be used for so-called treaty shopping, because some countries do offer prefer-
ential treatment with respect to withholding taxes.3 Second, conduit entities
in low-tax countries provide high-tax affiliates with internal debt. Borrowing
from affiliates located in low-tax conduit countries and lending to affiliates
2Note that Figure 1.3 only considers three-country structures, i.e. structures where the
destination country is different from the conduit country. If observations were included
that allow host and conduit country to be identical, the United States would have been
an important host as well as conduit country, because many US affiliates are held via US
holding companies.
3Note that the conduit entity is not necessarily located in a third country. Some
countries may provide special tax treatment for some firms, depending, for instance, on
the legal form. The special treatment of holdings in the Netherlands, financial holdings in
Luxembourg, or headquarters of foreign multinationals in Belgium (co-ordination centers)
are well-known examples (see Council of the European Union, 1999). Even a holding in
the same country is then possibly tax motivated. Profit and loss consolidation, which is
often allowed on a national basis only, can also explain tax motivated conduit entities
where no third country is involved (see Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008).
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Figure 1.2: Number of (In)Direct German Outbound Investments
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Figure 1.3: Conduit & Host Countries (Indirect Investments)
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in high-tax host countries will allow the latter to deduct interest payments
from profits and save taxes. Under certain conditions, for example if the
parent is also located in a high-tax country, this structure even allows for
two interest deductions for one investment.4 Finally, the low-tax conduit can
reinvest income and defer any payments to the parent. This last point is es-
pecially relevant for outbound investments from countries using a tax credit
system. However, income deferral of passive income may collide with con-
trolled foreign company (CFC) rules, depending on the type of income (for
further information about the US Subpart F legislation, see Hines, 1999; for
the German rule, see Weichenrieder, 1996). Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003)
confirm that tax deferral is an important strategy for US multinationals, be-
cause of the US tax system.5 They show that indirectly owned affiliates are
more sensitive to foreign tax-rate differences, because chains of ownership
can mitigate the effects of the US foreign tax credit system by expanding
opportunities to defer US tax liabilities. Incentives under ownership chains
are then comparable to incentives under exemption systems, because multi-
nationals can avoid repatriation taxes. Note, though, that implications of
using ownership chains are basically very different, depending on the tax
system of the parent country.
4This is called a double-dip structure and corresponds to the analysis in Section 1.3.2.
Some important tax attributes encourage this double-dip situation in the case of indirect
investments (see Mintz, 2004). First, parent country and host country do not limit interest
deduction; second, the parent country exempts conduit income; third, the conduit country
allows for special tax treatment of intermediate companies or is a low-tax country; fourth,
the conduit country (the host country) imposes little or no withholding tax on income
paid to the parent (conduit).
5In the US, companies are taxed on their worldwide income, irrespective of where it was
earned. Afterwards, to avoid double taxation, a company receives a credit for the taxes it
paid to a foreign government up to the amount it would have paid had it remained in the
US (tax credit system). In contrast, the method used by Germany and other countries is
called a territorial or exemption system. Here, only profits earned in the home country
are taxed.
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1.3 Theoretical Analysis
Consider a simple partial equilibrium model of a German multinational enter-
prise. The multinational is active in Germany G and also in a foreign country
F . Production is determined by a concave production function with stan-
dard properties, where fG(KG) denotes production in Germany, and fF (KF )
denotes production in the foreign country.6 The model follows the analysis
of Mintz (2004) and distinguishes two regimes, where Regime I (II) is the
direct (indirect) investment regime.
1.3.1 Direct Structure (Regime I)
Profits are determined by output, fG(KG) and fF (KF ). Both countries, Ger-
many and the foreign country, tax profits at rates of τG and τF , respectively.
We assume an interest rate i, which is identical for all types of borrowing
and in both countries. We further assume that foreign-source income is tax
exempt.7 Overall profits of the multinational (home and foreign profits) are
given by
pi = (1− τG)(fG(KG)− iBG) + iEF (1.1)
+ (1− τF )(fF (KF )− iBF )− iEF .
6Capital is the only variable input factor. The production function exhibits a positive
but decreasing marginal product of capital: f ′(·) > 0 and f ′′(·) < 0.
7Germany basically exempts foreign earnings from domestic taxation.
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The first line captures the profits of the German parent company. BG refers
to external debt finance. Accordingly, interest expenses iBG are deductible
from the tax base. Note that we abstract from opportunity costs for own
capital iEG. We may, however, define profits inclusive of iEG. The second
line refers to the profits of the foreign affiliate. The affiliate in F can borrow
from third-party lenders BF or finance with parent equity EF . The parent
receives dividends iEF without tax deduction. We keep EF in the model
– albeit it would cancel out in this first case – because it emphasizes one
crucial difference compared to the indirect structure (see below). The firm
maximizes profits subject to the following constraints:
KG + EF = BG,
KF = EF +BF ,
BG ≥ 0, BF ≥ 0.
Note that the first constraint implies that the parent also raises funds to
finance the foreign affiliate; actually more than necessary for its own invest-
ment KG. We further impose nonnegativity constraints on BG and BF . An
additional assumption is that the host country tax rate is always lower than
the home country tax rate (τG > τF ). If we maximize the model with respect
to KG and KF , taking into account all relevant restrictions, we obtain the
following marginal conditions:
f ′(KG) = i,
f ′(KF ) = i
(1− τG)
(1− τF ) .
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The first optimality condition points out that the decision of the parent
company is not distorted by corporate taxation. Abstracting from i, we refer
to the second expression as the tax wedge8 or the tax-related cost of capital of
the foreign affiliate. If we assume that the German tax rate always exceeds
the foreign tax rate, new investment is exclusively parent-debt financed.9
The equity transfer to the affiliate, therefore, is refinanced with external
debt. Assuming that the parent’s profits are positive (the parent is not tax-
exhaust), overall profits of the multinational enterprise are maximized. While
the optimality condition for the German part of the multinational implies tax
neutrality, the required rate of return for the foreign investment is below i,
because of simple tax arbitrage.
For a variation in the foreign statutory tax rate, we obtain the comparative
static effect which is unambiguously negative: a higher foreign tax rate τF
implies higher cost of capital and less investment
dKF
dτF
=
i(1− τG)
(1− τF )2f ′′(KF ) < 0.
8The term tax wedge simply reflects that the optimality condition is distorted, i.e.
f ′(KF ) 6= i. The tax wedge in the case of the foreign affiliate implies a reduction of the
cost of capital.
9We obtain this extreme result – complete debt finance – because we do not introduce
any costs associated with debt (and because τG > τF ). While these costs are neglected
in this model, the corporate finance literature refers to concepts where debt finance is
associated with additional costs (for surveys, see Myers, 2001; Graham, 2003).
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1.3.2 Indirect Structure (Regime II)
We rely on one structural difference when introducing the conduit structure:
the parent company still transfers equity funds to a foreign affiliate, but now
to a conduit entity. Subsequently, the conduit provides the foreign affiliate
F with internal debt, for which interest expenses are tax deductible. The
meaning of the above notation slightly changes: EF now refers to internal
debt if we consider the foreign affiliate; it refers to equity if we consider the
parent firm. Any further activity of the conduit is not modeled, because
we are only interested in investment activities of the affiliate in F . The
multinational’s profits are determined by
pi = (1− τG)(fG(KG)− iBG) + iEF (1.2)
+ (1− τF )(fF (KF )− iBF − iEF ).
We assume that transfers, including interest payments to the conduit, can
be channeled from the affiliate to the parent without any tax deduction.
The model then describes the so-called double-dip structure, because the
multinational can deduct interest payments in the host country and in the
home country.10 We maximize the model subject to the above constraints
and obtain two expressions for the cost of capital:
10Intuitively, the German parent takes up more capital than necessary to finance its
own investment. Interest expenses in Germany are deductible for corporate tax purposes.
The foreign affiliate is internal debt financed, and associated interest expenses are again
deductible. Hence we have two interest deductions for the same investment.
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f ′(KG) = i,
f ′(KF ) = i
(1− τG − τF )
(1− τF ) .
The foreign affiliate’s capital costs are further reduced, because of the ad-
ditional interest deduction. A variation in the foreign tax rate yields the
following positive expression
dKF
dτF
=
−iτG
(1− τF )2f ′′(KF ) > 0.
The prediction of a positive tax effect is the result of the double-dip interest
deduction, because a higher foreign tax rate implies that interest deductions
are even more valuable.
1.3.3 Indirect Structure (Extended)
We extend the indirect model with respect to one critical assumption. While
Equation (1.2) implies that interest payments received by the conduit are tax
exempt, we introduce a tax τC on interest payments to the conduit. Profits
can then be written as
pi = (1− τG)(fG(KG)− iBG) + iEF (1.3)
+ (1− τF )(fF (KF )− iBF − iEF )− τCiEF .
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τC may denote withholding taxes as well as the conduit country tax rate.
The marginal decision of the foreign affiliate is then determined by
f ′(KF ) = i
(1− τG − (τF − τC))
(1− τF ) .
There is no longer any tax advantage compared to the direct structure if τF
equals τC . If τC < τF , the tax wedge ranges somewhere between the direct
and the indirect solution.
To sum up, theory suggests two different regimes with two (three) differ-
ent measures for the tax-related cost of capital. Hence, tax wedges T for
respective regimes follow:
T1 =
(1− τG)
(1− τF ) , (1.4)
T2 =
(1− τG − τF )
(1− τF ) , (1.5)
T ∗2 =
(1− τG − τF + τC)
(1− τF ) . (1.6)
T1 applies to the direct structure (Regime I); T2 is the relevant tax measure
for the indirect structure (Regime II); and T ∗2 relates to the extended indirect
structure where τC is also considered.
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1.4 Investigation Approach
The purpose of the empirical investigation is to estimate how taxes affect
affiliate-level investment. The theoretical analysis suggests two different
regimes, depending on whether investments are direct or indirect. One way
to approach this problem is to consider direct and indirect investments as
two separate samples, simply split observations, and estimate two distinct
equations. However, firms do not randomly choose one or the other regime,
and a simple split does not fully account for this endogeneity.11
To address the endogeneity problem we follow the literature and estimate
an endogenous switching regression model, where the switching rule is ob-
served. (Lee, 1978) suggests a two-step procedure: first, estimate the binary
variable R indicating whether the investment is directly or indirectly held.
Subsequently, estimate affiliate investment in a second stage and condition
on the regime choice.
11We can think of endogeneity in this context in many different ways. First, there
are some firms switching from one regime to the other. The ultimate regression sample
contains exactly 50 affiliates switching at least once over the whole time span. Second,
firms’ potentials to cushion shocks differ, depending on the regime. Hence, the regime
is correlated with these shocks. Third, the variable of interest, affiliate-level investment,
may also differ structurally with respect to all control variables. Fourth, regime choice and
investment level may be simultaneously determined. Another intuitive way to think about
endogeneity is to look at the decision to establish an indirect structure. The existence of
preferential tax treatments, or generally differences in international taxation, presumably
distort the decision to establish a conduit structure. Furthermore, if the heterogeneity
in multinationals’ potentials determines the regime, we have a problem of self selection,
or selection into the regime. Note that any fixed-effects approach may account for time-
invariant preferences (e.g., Vella, 1998). Yet the proclivity of multinationals to choose a
specific regime can vary over time.
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From a taxation perspective, conduit structures should generally be domi-
nant, empirically. However, descriptive statistics show that the majority of
investments are direct. The reason may be that indirect structures are also
costly: while every foreign activity is associated with costs (e.g., Markusen,
1995), a conduit entity involves additional control and information problems,
and hence, additional costs which reduce the probability to choose the indi-
rect structure. We summarize the decision to establish a conduit entity (the
first-stage decision) with the following equations
Rijkt =
 1 if INDijkt > 0,0 otherwise.
INDijkt = h[cijkt(Xijkt, γi)].
Rijkt is a binary variable indicating whether the multinational j is investing
in country k at time t in an affiliate i via a conduit entity or not. INDijkt is
the corresponding unobserved propensity and cijkt represents the company-
specific costs associated with the conduit firm. These costs are determined
by affiliate and company-group variables and also by host-location factors
such as the host country tax rate τkt. Hence, a vector Xijkt of observable
host-country characteristics as well as affiliate- and company-group-specific
characteristics determine costs. Finally, γi captures unobserved preferences
of affiliates, which may be important, for instance, because of affiliate-specific
management strategies. First-step estimation equations are then specified as
Rijkt = a1BSTjt + a2PROjt + a4Xijkt + ξt + γi + uijkt. (1.7)
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The respective regime choice is identified by the company-group-specific vari-
ables BSTjt and PROjt, which may reflect the group-specific ability as re-
gards establishing a conduit entity. BSTjt is the balance-sheet total of the
multinational group; PROjt refers to the profitability of the multinational.
12
Moreover, all relevant second-stage explanatory variables are considered (in-
cluding affiliate-specific effects γi, and aggregate time effects ξt). From first-
stage regressions we obtain estimates for an additional selection term λˆ. In-
cluding λˆ in the equations of interest allows us to consistently estimate
Regime I: Y1,ijkt = α1 + α2T1,kt + α3Xijkt + λˆ1,ijkt
+ ψt + ϕi + ²1,ijkt iff Rijkt = 1,
Regime II: Y2,ijkt = β1 + β2T2,kt + β3Xijkt + λˆ2,ijkt
+ ψt + ϕi + ²2,ijkt iff Rijkt = 0.
Y denotes affiliate-level investment. Xijkt is a vector of affiliate- and country-
specific control variables. To control for selection, we include estimated se-
lection terms, λˆ1 =
φ(Xaˆ)
Φ(Xaˆ)
and λˆ2 =
φ(Xaˆ)
1−Φ(Xaˆ) , as additional regressors (see
Maddala, 1983).13 Finally, T1 and T2 are the tax-related cost of capital for
12For further data and variable definitions see Section 1.5 and Appendix B. Note that
empirical identification requires at least one variable that explains the regime choice. We
may refer to this variable as an instrument. The nonlinearity of the probability model
can already be sufficient to identify the regime. Yet this can cause collinearity among
regressors since we condition on the regime choice in the second stage (Wooldridge, 2002).
Note also that we do not aim to explain which countries are preferable conduit-entity
locations. Rather, we are interested in the multinational’s regime choice, i.e. the first-
stage decision to establish a conduit structure at all, where the company can choose any
potential conduit location.
13φ denotes the standard normal density function; Φ the distribution function. The
ratio ( φ(Xaˆ)Φ(Xaˆ) ) is also known as the inverse Mills ratio.
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direct and indirect structures as defined in Equations (1.4) and (1.5), respec-
tively.
The empirical implementation of this two-step approach in context of panel
data and unobserved heterogeneity in both equations requires further consid-
erations. We follow the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (1995) for panel
data selection models.14
1.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data for the empirical analysis are taken from the Microdatabase Di-
rect Investment (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This is an
affiliate-level database of German multinationals’ foreign investments. The
data provide information about the investment object’s balance sheet, in-
cluding further information on the type of investment and on the investor. A
favorable aspect of MiDi is that the current version is available as affiliate-
level panel data for the period 1996 to 2005. Moreover, data collection is
enforced by German law, which sets reporting obligations for certain inter-
national transactions and positions.15 As a crucial variable for this analysis,
14Appendix A contains further details concerning the Wooldridge (1995) estimator and,
especially, the procedure for correcting standard errors.
15Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (Trade and Payments Act) in connection with Außen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation). Each German multina-
tional has to report its foreign assets including both direct and indirect FDI, conditional
on some lower threshold level for mandatory reporting. Since 2002, investments have to
be reported if the participation is 10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the foreign
object is above 3 million euros. Though previous years showed lower thresholds, this level
is uniformly applied for all years in the panel. For details see Lipponer (2007).
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MiDi includes the information on whether the German multinational invests
directly or indirectly via a conduit entity.
Below regressions analyze the determinants of affiliate-level investment. In-
vestment is defined as the logarithmic difference in the balance-sheet item
‘fixed assets’.16 We can interpret this variable as a growth rate, but we mostly
refer to ‘investment’ in the following. One explanatory variable is the tax
wedge T as defined above. This variable is expected to be negatively related
to affiliate-level investment (see Section 1.3). In order to control for country
characteristics, we employ various host country variables: GDP to capture
market size, labor cost in manufacturing and the local lending rate to capture
differences in factor prices.17 Furthermore, we control for the present value
of depreciation allowances defined by the countries’ tax code. Besides, we
condition on the affiliate-specific variables sales and loss carry-forward. We
expect a positive sign for sales, because this is an indicator for the affiliate’s
size and cash flow. The dummy variable loss carry-forward indicates whether
some loss carry-forward is reported. The existence of losses in the previous
periods may capture characteristics of the current decision problem of the
company such as the expected performance of an affiliate. This variable is
expected to be negatively related to investment.
Table 1.1 summarizes all relevant regression variables and respective mean
values. The estimation sample is restricted to majority holdings. More-
16The dependent variable is calculated as: ln(fixed assetst) - ln(fixed assetst−1).
17MiDi does not provide information on affiliate-specific labor costs, or interest pay-
ments, etc.
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Table 1.1: Variable Description
Mean Values
(Standard Errors)
Regime I Regime II
Statutory Tax Rate .308 .327
(.073) (.072)
Tax Wedge (T1 & T2) .839 .345
(.095) (.171)
Tax Wedge (T ∗2 ) .351
(.173)
Tax Wedge (T ∗2a) .495
(.159)
Tax Wedge (T ∗2b) .634
(b)
(.144)
Tax Wedge (T ∗2c) .695
(c)
T
ax
V
ar
ia
bl
es
(.135)
Country GDP (in US$ bill.) 951 1,790
(1,993) (2,839)
Labor Cost (in US$) 13.79 16.89
(8.78) (7.55)
Lending Rate .076 .066
(.046) (.034)
Present Value of Depreciation .806 .802C
ou
nt
ry
Le
ve
l
(.052) (.049)
Fixed Assets (in e mill.) 15.62 27.22
(86.93) (133.26)
Sales (in e mill.) 55.50 91.42
(255.17) (434.64)
Loss carry-forward (binary) .304 .326
A
ffi
lia
te
Le
ve
l
(.460) (.469)
Observations 14,487 5,949
Affiliate-level data are taken from MiDi. Corporate taxation data are taken
from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), and from tax
surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG. The lending rates refer
to credits to the private sector and are taken from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics Yearbook (2006) augmented with corresponding OECD figures.
GDP in U.S. dollars, nominal, is taken from World Bank World Development
Indicators (2006). Hourly labor costs in U.S. dollars for production workers in
manufacturing are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Euro-
stat. T1 and T2 refer to Equations (1.4) and (1.5). T ∗2 refers to (1.6), where τC
corresponds to the relevant withholding tax rate for interest payments. Note
that withholding tax data refers to the year 2005. τC is equal to 10% (T
∗
2a),
20% (T ∗2b), and 25% (T
∗
2c) for all observations. Different sample size:
(b) 5,554
observations, (c) 5,030 observations.
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over, financial services, partnerships, and non-manufacturing observations
are excluded (see Table 1.7 in the Appendix for a detailed classification).
According to theory, we remove observations if the German tax rate is below
the statutory tax rate of the destination country.18 Tax wedges are defined
according to Equations (1.4), (1.5), and (1.6). Since withholding taxes are
often negotiated in double tax treaties, the withholding tax rate τC depends
on the location of the conduit entity and potential treaties of host countries
with conduit countries. To check the sensitivity of the analysis, we further
define T ∗2a, T
∗
2b, and T
∗
2c, where we set τC at 10%, 20%, and 25%, respectively,
for all observations (see also Section 1.7). The consideration for this is that
we change the composition of the sample, because the maximization problem
in Section 1.3.3 requires that τC is below the host country tax rate. If this
condition is not fulfilled, the observation is removed. Additionally, we change
the variation of the nonlinear tax wedge.
Whereas tax wedges differ by construction, a comparison of other variables’
mean values already indicate structural differences. As we would expect, the
mean statutory tax rate is higher in Regime II. Market size, reflected by GDP,
is on average twice as high in Regime II. Moreover, investments are much
bigger in the case of the indirect structures – in terms of fixed assets and
also in terms of sales. Finally, one may speculate whether the difference in
average labor cost reflects the motivation for the foreign investments (vertical
FDI versus horizontal FDI).
18The relevant German statutory tax rate is adjusted for the non-deductibility of interest
expenses, because this is the relevant measure for the basic arbitrage condition.
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1.6 Regression Analysis
Table 1.2 reports regression results where we simply split the sample and
estimate the respective regime. As expected, we find a negative impact of
the statutory tax rate and of the tax wedge T1 on direct investments. While
we partially confirm theory by finding a positive, but not significant, tax rate
effect on indirect investments, in Column (4) we confirm the negative effect of
the tax wedge as defined in Equation (1.5). Additional control variables such
as the affiliate-specific sales, or the dummy variable for the loss carry-forward
are included in all specifications. Both affiliate-specific variables show the
expected sign. The fixed effects approach removes all cross-section variation
between affiliates and also nests country fixed effects. In this sense, it is not
surprising that country-specific variables, for example GDP or labor cost, are
statistically insignificant. We find, however, a significant positive effect of the
local lending rate for some specifications. The positive coefficient may reflect
the comparative advantage of multinationals compared to domestic firms,
because multinationals can rely on internal capital markets. Note that all
regressions control for variations in German lending conditions by including a
full set of time dummies. Thereby, we also capture general taxing conditions
in Germany which are the same for all German parent firms.
Since we condition on affiliate-specific effects in this sample split, estimates
are consistent if sample selection – the choice of the regime – depends on
the constant affiliate-specific component (e.g., Vella, 1998). If this affiliate-
specific effect does not fully capture selection, i.e. if the selection effect varies
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Table 1.2: Regression Results (Sample Split)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Statutory Tax Rate -.533 ∗ .828
(.285) (.580)
Tax Wedge (T1) -.448 ∗
(.249)
Tax Wedge (T2) -.949 ∗
(.499)
Tax Wedge (T ∗2 ) -.152
(.722)
log(Sales) .030 .046 .030 .046 .046
(.020) (.050) (.020) (.050) (.050)
Loss carry-forward -.034∗∗ -.060∗ -.034∗∗ -.059∗ -.059∗
(.016) (.035) (.016) (.035) (.035)
log(GDP) -.200 .031 -.218 .004 .056
(.201) (.118) (.200) (.120) (.125)
log(Labor Cost) .027 -.210 .035 -.188 -.231
(.199) (.197) (.198) (.200) (.201)
log(Lending Rate) .107∗∗∗ .079 .108∗∗∗ .083 .095
(.042) (.064) (.042) (.061) (.061)
Present Value Depr. -.140 .024 -.140 .007 .015
(.229) (.559) (.233) (.565) (.546)
Regime I II I II II
Firms 3,377 1,627 3,377 1,627 1,627
Observations 14,487 5,949 14,487 5,949 5,949
Host Countries 32 33 32 33 33
Dependent variable is investment, defined as the logarithmic difference in the balance-
sheet position fixed assets (ln(fixed assetst) - ln(fixed assetst−1)). Time and affiliate-
level fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
robust and clustered (year-country cell). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the
(1%) (5%) (10%) level. T1 is defined according to Equation (1.4). T2 follows (1.5). T ∗2
corresponds to Equation (1.6).
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Table 1.3: Regression Results (Switching Regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Statutory Tax Rate -.450 ∗∗ .900 ∗
(.229) (.530)
Tax Wedge (T1) -.383 ∗
(.210)
Tax Wedge (T2) -.994 ∗∗
(.484)
Tax Wedge (T ∗2 ) -.184
(.816)
log(Sales) .029 .044 .030 .044 .043
(.019) (.055) (.019) (.055) (.055)
Loss carry-forward -.035∗∗ -.060 -.035∗∗ -.059 -.059
(.016) (.038) (.016) (.038) (.038)
log(GDP) -.233∗ .027 -.248∗ -.001 .052
(.133) (.097) (.135) (.157) (.146)
log(Labor Cost) .043 -.254 .050 -.233 -.274∗
(.129) (.163) (.136) (.167) (.165)
log(Lending Rate) .111∗∗∗ .075 .112∗∗∗ .080 .091
(.029) (.056) (.030) (.101) (.097)
Present Value Depr. -.109 .059 -.113 .042 .045
(.187) (.530) (.195) (1.21) (1.11)
Regime I II I II II
Firms 3,377 1,627 3,377 1,627 1,627
Observations 14,487 5,949 14,487 5,949 5,949
Host Countries 32 33 32 33 33
Dependent variable is investment, defined as the logarithmic difference in the balance-
sheet position fixed assets (ln(fixed assetst) - ln(fixed assetst−1)). Time dummies and
linearized affiliate-level fixed effects are included but not reported. All estimations take
into account the endogeneity of the regime choice. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
robust for any form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and account for the two-
step estimation (see Wooldridge, 1995). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%)
(5%) (10%) level. All reported results refer to Specification (2) of the probit equation
(see Appendix B, Table 1.6). T1 is defined according to Equation (1.4). T2 follows (1.5).
T ∗2 corresponds to (1.6).
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over time, our estimates are not consistent. Table 1.3 presents the results
from switching regressions, where we additionally condition on the selection
effect λˆ.19 Basically, the results confirm findings in Table 1.2. However, the
positive tax rate effect for the indirect investments is now significant. The
estimated coefficient for the tax wedge T1 in Column (3) implies that a 1 per-
centage point higher tax wedge is associated with -.38% less new investment
in fixed assets. The regression in Column (4) suggests that a 1 percentage
point higher indirect tax wedge is associated with -.99% less investment. The
results confirm the double-dip structure as modeled in Section 1.3.2, because
T2 is calculated accordingly. In a further step, we consider that host coun-
tries possibly impose withholding taxes. T ∗2 now refers to Equation (1.6),
where τC corresponds to the bilateral withholding tax for interest payments
between the host country and the conduit country. The insignificant coeffi-
cient in Column (5) may indicate that multinationals can avoid withholding
taxes, for example, by using sophisticated conduit chains, or by benefiting
from favorable tax treatment.
Table 1.4 summarizes the estimated selection effects (specifications refer to
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.3). A test on the joint significance of the
9 selection terms confirms a bias for both samples. Selection can basically
depend on the general economic environment, for example cyclical fluctua-
tions, and how multinationals are able to cope with it. Note, though, that
we do not have any well-defined expectations about the sign of the selection
19See Appendix B for the first-stage regression results and interpretation. Results are ro-
bust with respect to the inclusion of regime-identifying variables. However, all regressions
in Table 1.3 use Specification (2) from Table 1.6 for identification.
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variables. However, we estimate a significant positive effect for most years
of the direct sample. This is, intuitively, what we would expect: a higher
probability to invest directly implies less new investment (the selection term
can be interpreted as the inverse probability to choose the direct regime).
Yet the findings for the indirect sample are ambiguous.
Table 1.4: Sample Selection Bias
Regime I Regime II
Selection 1997 .405 ∗ (.249) -1.17 ∗∗ (.571)
Selection 1998 -.011 (.020) -.030 (.055)
Selection 1999 -.001 (.019) .005 (.042)
Selection 2000 .372 ∗ (.209) .410 (.550)
Selection 2001 -.085 (.130) .227 (.165)
Selection 2002 .247 ∗ (.133) -.012 (.097)
Selection 2003 -.059 ∗ (.032) -.018 (.058)
Selection 2004 .145 (.096) .236 (.194)
Selection 2005 .098 (.065) .239 ∗∗ (.117)
Wald-test (χ29) 23.80 15.72
p-value .005 .073
Observations 14,487 5,949
Selection variables 1997 - 2005 (λˆt) are obtained from first-stage estimates (see Appendix B,
Table 1.6). Coefficients refer to Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 1.3. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are robust for any form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and account for
the two-step estimation (see Wooldridge, 1995). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%)
(5%) (10%) level.
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1.7 Sensitivity Analysis
Eventually, we test the robustness of the regression analysis. Table 1.5
presents estimations for both regimes. Columns (1) and (4) refer to 27 Eu-
ropean Union (EU) member countries. Columns (2) and (5) refer to the EU
15. The reason for this sample restriction is that we possibly cannot cap-
ture relevant withholding tax rates, because conduit chains are complex and
income is channeled through different conduit countries. Moreover, there is
preferential tax treatment for some firms in many countries, with preferential
treatment depending, for instance, on the legal form of the affiliate (see, e.g.,
Council of the European Union, 1999). If we restrict countries on the Euro-
pean Union, however, we can test the robustness of the findings, because the
EU parent-subsidiary directive, the EU interest and royalties directive, and
existing double-tax treaties often rule out withholding taxes. All results from
above regressions are confirmed in Table 1.5. In a next step, we only analyze
affiliates from the manufacturing sector (Columns (3) and (6)). Findings are
also robust with respect to this sample restriction. Finally, Columns (7),
(8), and (9) employ tax wedges, where the tax rate τC equals 10%, 20%,
and 25%, for all observations. This changes the variation of the nonlinear
tax term, and imposes a further restriction on the sample. Accordingly, all
observations are removed if the host tax rate is above 10%, 20%, or 25% (the
maximization problem in Section 1.3.3 requires that the host country tax
rate is higher than taxation in the conduit country). All findings confirm the
negative tax wedge effect, but the last specification is no longer significant.
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1.8 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the affiliate-level investment decision of German
multinationals. A theoretical model yields different corporate tax effects, de-
pending on whether the multinational follows a direct or an indirect invest-
ment strategy. Accordingly, we estimate a switching regression model with
observed switching for two structurally different regimes. This approach al-
lows us to control for the endogeneity of the regime choice. The empirical
results confirm theoretical predictions: corporate tax effects are negative for
direct investments, but positive for indirect observations. The tax-related
cost of capital is confirmed to be negatively related to investment in both
regimes. In particular, according to Specifications (3) and (4) of Table 1.3,
we find a semi-elasticity of -.38 for direct and -.99 for indirect investments.
The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that income can be trans-
ferred to the German parent without any tax deduction. This may be rea-
sonable, given that many conditions promoting the double-dip structure are
fulfilled. First, Germany is a high-tax country.20 Second, Germany exempts
dividend income almost completely. Third, the major conduit countries (see
Section 1.2) are well-known conduit locations, often with preferential tax
regimes.21 Fourth, real conduit structures can be more complicated. Indeed,
indirect structures often involve not only one conduit entity, but complex
20If Germany is not the high-tax country, the observation is removed in Section 1.6 and
1.7.
21Special tax regimes often apply to holding companies (e.g., in Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, UK; see, e.g., Council of the European Union, 1999).
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multi-country ownership chains (Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008). This may
open up more opportunities to avoid taxes.
One remarkable aspect of the findings is the implication for tax competition:
the existence of conduit structures and low-tax conduit countries reduces the
downward pressure on statutory tax rates. One may speculate whether this
explains why some countries can stick to relatively high statutory tax rates.
However, tax competition is a phenomenon which is not confined to one spe-
cific aspect. In fact, since national governments can use tax preferences as a
strategic policy variable (see Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008), tax competition
for conduit entities may well be intensified.
Appendix A: Selection Correction for Panel
Data Models under Conditional Mean Inde-
pendence Assumption
Wooldridge (1995) suggests a flexible two-stage regression method to correct
for sample selection bias in panel data models. We apply a similar estimation
strategy on the above switching regression model, which allows us to perform
robust statistical inference. Appendix A summarizes the main points of the
estimator, with an emphasis on standard error correction. For details and
consistency proofs, please consult the Wooldridge (1995) paper. The esti-
mator allows for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effects (γi, ϕi)
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and observable explanatory variables.22 Furthermore, the error distribution
in the second-stage equation remains unspecified; the idiosyncratic errors can
be arbitrarily serially dependent and can have any form of heterogeneity.
We proceed with a version of the above switching regression model, where
we slightly change notations for simplicity and stick closer to Wooldridge
(1995). We start the analysis by first estimating a probit model
P (Rit = 1|xi) = Φ(xiδt). (1.8)
Equation (1.8) is estimated by standard probit techniques,23 however for each
time period t. Subsequently, we obtain estimates for the selection terms,
λˆ1,i = φ(xiδˆt)/Φ(xiδˆt) and λˆ2,i = φ(xiδˆt)/(1 − Φ(xiδˆt)), which are then in-
cluded as control variables in the second-stage regressions (Maddala, 1983).
Regime I: y1,it = θ1wˆ1,it + u1,it iff R = 1. (1.9)
Regime II: y2,it = θ2wˆ2,it + u2,it iff R = 0. (1.10)
Here, wˆ is defined as wˆR,it = (1, xR,it, xi, 0, ..., 0, λˆR,it, 0, ..., 0), for R = 1, 2.
24
Note that we additionally include the estimated probability terms λˆR(R =
1, 2) from first-stage regressions and also firm-specific means to control for
22A significant part of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by unobserved
heterogeneity between firms. This unobserved effect is likely to be correlated with other
control variables. Hence, consistent coefficients require a fixed effects approach.
23(x) is a vector of control variables, including all second-stage regressors and additional
regime-identifying variables.
24The index R still denotes the Regime, but no longer refers to the binary variable.
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unobserved heterogeneity.25 Subsequently, we obtain the coefficient vector
θR(R = 1, 2) from a pooled OLS regression:
θˆR ≡ (
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆ′R,itwˆR,it)
−1(
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆ′R,ityˆR,it), R = 1, 2.
Finally, we have to account for the two-stage estimation procedure. We
obtain Avar(θˆ) by first defining OLS residuals, eˆR,it ≡ yit − wˆitθˆ for Rit =
1, 2; i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T . To estimate Avar(θˆ), we further define Dˆ:
DˆR ≡ N−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆ′R,itθˆ
′
RGR,it for R = 1, 2, (1.11)
where G is GˆR,it =
 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . ZˆR,it 0 . . . 0
 . (1.12)
The matrix Zit is Zit = (0
′0′...0′ vˆitxi 0′...0′)′. vˆit is the derivative of λ(·)
evaluated at xiδˆt. For simplicity, we continue without the regime identifier
R and estimate Avar(θˆ) for the respective regime. To obtain Avar(θˆ) as
Aˆ−1BˆAˆ−1/N , we further define
25Following Wooldridge (1995), we linearize the unobserved effects according to the
Chamberlain (1980, 1982) method, who suggests to include all leads and lags of explana-
tory variables in order to model the relationship between the unobserved effect and the
exogenous variables. To save degrees of freedom, however, we apply the Mundlak (1978)
approach that imposes time-constant coefficients and include mean values of explanatory
variables (xi).
Chapter 1 – Foreign (In)Direct Investment and Corporate Taxation 33
Aˆ ≡ N−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆ′itwˆit, (1.13)
Bˆ = N−1
N∑
i=1
pˆipˆ
′
i, (1.14)
pˆi = qˆi − Dˆrˆi, i = 1, ..., N, (1.15)
qˆi ≡
T∑
t=1
wˆ′iteˆit, i = 1, ..., N, (1.16)
Dˆ ≡ N−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆ′itθˆ
′∇δxˆit(δˆ)′, (1.17)
where∇δxˆit(δˆ)′ is the gradient of xˆit(δˆ)′, evaluated at δˆ; rˆit is defined for each
t as minus the inverse of the average estimated Hessian times the estimated
score of the probit log-likelihood function for observation i, where we use the
standard results for the first- and second derivatives for the probit model
(e.g., Maddala, 1983). Finally, we estimate Avar(θˆ) as Aˆ−1BˆAˆ−1/N and
obtain valid standard errors.
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Appendix B: First-Stage Regression Results,
Data Sources, Definitions, Sample Restrictions
The first-stage regression is concerned with the estimation of a probit model,
where group-specific variables identify the respective regime (see Equation
(1.7)). The results for pooled probit regressions are reported in Table 1.6.26
We find that a higher balance-sheet total (BSTjt) of the whole company
group is associated with a higher probability of establishing an indirect struc-
ture. All regression results in Tables 1.3 to 1.5, however, are reported accord-
ing to Specification (2), where profitability (PROjt) is included as a second
identifying variable.27 The findings indicate that a higher profitability of the
company group is associated with a higher propensity to invest indirectly.28
Both effects may indicate that multinational enterprises need a certain level
of size and sophistication to invest in an indirect structure. We may specu-
late whether only big and profitable companies have the required expertise
to perform international tax planning. While the second-stage regressions
consider affiliate-level variation, where we also control for affiliate-specific
heterogeneity, balance-sheet total and profitability vary at the group level.
Therefore, we argue that both the balance-sheet total and the profitability
26Note that the empirical model in Sections 1.6 and 1.7 follows Wooldridge (1995), who
suggests to estimate probits for single years t to obtain λˆ.
27Specification tests indicate that results are robust, irrespective of whether Specification
(1) or (2) is used.
28Profitability is defined as total profits of the multinational (after taxes, prior to profit
distribution, and offsetting of losses carried forward), relative to the balance-sheet total
of the group.
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on the multinational-group level are valid identifying variables. If we were
considering variation between countries – we actually remove it by condi-
tioning on affiliate-specific heterogeneity – we would also expect the local
tax rate to be a crucial determinant of the regime choice. To sum up, the es-
timations suggest that, after conditioning on affiliate-specific heterogeneity,
group-specific variables are the only relevant factors affecting the choice of
the regime.
Table 1.6: Regime Identification
(1) (2)
log(Balance-Sheet Total) -.111 ∗∗∗ (.019) -.113 ∗∗∗ (.019)
Profitability -.006 ∗∗∗ (.002)
Statutory Tax Rate -.007 (.363) -.009 (.363)
log(Sales) .000 (.011) -.000 (.011)
Loss carry-forward .008 (.017) .008 (.017)
log(GDP) -.075 (.113) -.072 (.113)
log(Labor Cost) -.030 (.134) -.032 (.134)
log(Lending Rate) .002 (.034) .002 (.034)
Present Value of Depr. .065 (.296) .062 (.296)
LogL. -9,179 -9,179
Observations 20,436 20,436
Dependent variable is the binary indicator for direct/indirect (1/0) investment. Probit estimation in-
cluding time-specific effects and linearized unobserved affiliate-specific effects. Robust standard errors (in
parentheses). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. Balance-sheet Total is the
annual aggregate at group level. Profitability is the profitability of the multinational group, defined as
total profits of the multinational (after taxes, prior to profit distribution, and offsetting of losses carried
forward), relative to the balance-sheet total of the company group.
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Table 1.7: Data Sources, Definitions, and Sample Restrictions
Firm-level Data Source: Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi).
Definition: Investment is the logarithmic difference in the
balance-sheet item fixed assets.
Corporate Tax Rates Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
(IBFD), Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG.
Definition: Statutory Corporate Tax Rates.
Withholding Tax Rates Source: Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide provided by
Ernst&Young. Withholding tax rates refer to 2005.
Definition: Withholding taxes on interest payments.
GDP Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2006).
Definition: Gross domestic product in US$, nominal.
Labor Cost Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Eurostat.
Definition: Hourly compensation costs for production work-
ers in manufacturing in US$.
Lending Rate Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook
(2006), augmented with corresponding OECD figures.
Definition: Interest rate for credits to the private sector.
Present values of Source: Depreciation rules from above tax-data references
depreciation allowances Definition: Calculated for investments in machinery, dis-
count rate 7.1 percent.
Sample Restrictions According to the model, we drop all observations where the
German statutory tax rate is below the foreign statutory tax
rate, τG < τF . Tax rates account for the non-deductibility of
interest expenses with respect to the German local business
tax. Minority holdings and partnerships are excluded, as
well as the following non-manufacturing sectors: education,
health, veterinary and social care, financial services, holding
companies, other services, recreational, cultural and sport-
ing activities, retail and wholesale trade, real estate and
renting, research and development, telecommunication and
post, private households with employees activities of other
membership organizations, nonprofit organizations serving
households, general government, sewage and refuse disposal,
compulsory social security, agriculture, hunting and forestry
(see Lipponer, 2007). Note that restrictions do not apply on
Figures 1.2 and 1.3.
Sensitivity Analysis Table 1.5 refers to the following sample definitions:
Sample 1 (2): only EU 27 (EU 15) member countries.
Sample 3: only manufacturing industries.
Sample 4: sets τC at 10% for all observations. The basic
arbitrage condition then requires that host country tax rates
are higher than 10%.
Sample 5: sets τC at 20% for all observations. The basic
arbitrage condition then requires that host country tax rates
are higher than 20%.
Sample 6: sets τC at 25% for all observations. The basic
arbitrage condition then requires that host country tax rates
are higher than 25%.
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Abstract∗
This paper investigates tax-planning behavior by means of internal debt
finance and the effectiveness of government countermeasures via thin-capita-
lization rules. A simple theoretical model which considers the financing de-
cision of a multinational company is used to obtain empirical implications.
The empirical analysis, based on German inbound investment data from 1996
to 2004, confirms the significant impact tax-rate differentials have on the use
of internal debt. The effectiveness of the German thin-capitalization rule
is tested by using legal amendments as natural experiments. The results
suggest that thin-capitalization rules induce significantly lower internal bor-
rowing. Hence, tax planning via internal finance is effectively limited by
thin-capitalization rules.
2.1 Introduction
It is a well established fact, both from the theoretical and empirical points of
view, that taxes play an important role in determining the capital structure
of companies (e.g., Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963; Desai et al., 2004).
To minimize the tax burden of the whole company group, a multinational
enterprise in particular can choose its capital structure according to differ-
ences in international taxation. Borrowing from affiliates located in low-tax
countries and lending to affiliates in high-tax countries will allow a deduc-
tion of interest payments from profits at high-tax locations and a reduction
of the overall tax payments. Typically, to limit adverse tax revenue conse-
quences, high-tax countries attempt to restrict the use of internal debt by
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Michael Overesch. The corresponding pa-
per “Corporate Tax Planning and Thin-Capitalization Rules – Evidence from a Quasi-
Experiment” is forthcoming in Applied Economics.
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imposing so-called thin-capitalization or earning stripping rules. In recent
years, increased attention has been given to multinationals’ profit shifting
via internal loans. For example, the number of EU member countries that
rely on some form of debt-to-equity restriction has increased from 8 in 1996
to 17 in 2005. From a theoretical perspective, these rules are suitable for lim-
iting profit shifting (e.g., Fuest and Hemmelgarn, 2005; Panteghini, 2006).
Yet empirical evidence as to whether governments have been successful is still
rare. Indeed, this is crucial for policymakers who want to defend tax revenues
against cross-country tax planning on the part of multinationals. However,
effective thin-capitalization rules possibly imply less financial flexibility for
some firms and adversely affect investment. In order to evaluate this trade-
off, it is important to find out more about the impact of thin-capitalization
rules on financial decisions and about the associated tax-revenue effects.
In providing evidence on the tax sensitivity of companies’ capital structure
choices, previous empirical studies have usually not taken into account thin-
capitalization rules. For a sample of US controlled affiliates, Desai et al.
(2004) show that higher local tax rates are associated with higher debt-to-
asset ratios. Their analysis points out that internal borrowing, in particular,
reacts sensitively to taxation. This result is confirmed by Buettner et al.
(2006) and by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) for German multinationals.
So far, evidence for the effects of thin-capitalization rules on companies’ de-
cisions has only been provided by Buettner et al. (2008). They find that
thin-capitalization rules effectively restrict debt finance but also affect in-
vestment of German multinationals.
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The question we address in this paper is whether thin-capitalization rules
effectively restrict the tax-planning behavior of multinationals. For the em-
pirical analysis, we use German inbound investment data. We expect German
multinationals to engage in tax-planning activities, because hardly any other
country has higher statutory corporate tax rates than Germany. We exploit
legal amendments made to the German thin-capitalization rule in 2001 and
2004, where only some legal forms were treated. This quasi-experimental set-
ting enables us to use a difference-in-differences approach to identify whether
thin-capitalization rules are successfully imposed. The empirical results sug-
gest that both tax-rate differentials and thin-capitalization rules are crucial
for multinationals’ capital structures. In particular, our findings indicate
that some companies, which were affected by a stricter thin-capitalization
rule, subsequently adjusted their capital structure. Hence, governments in
high-tax countries are, to some extent, able to restrict multinationals’ profit
shifting.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with some institutional details
about the German thin-capitalization rule. Thereafter, we set up a theoreti-
cal model which considers the financing decision of a multinational and takes
into account a thin-capitalization rule. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, we present
the empirical investigation approach and the data. The empirical results are
presented in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 briefly concludes.
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2.2 Some Institutional Details
The high level of German company taxation and also the comparatively low
corporate tax revenues are well documented (European Communities, 2005).
Firms are burdened with a very high statutory tax rate comprising a corpo-
rate income tax and, additionally, a local trade income tax. It is reasonable
to assume that a multinational company allocates internal debt optimally
with respect to differences in international taxation. Thereby, taxable prof-
its are reduced by means of interest deduction. As a result, jurisdictions lose
corporate tax revenue and consequently try to defend their tax base by im-
posing some form of restriction, for example, thin-capitalization rules. These
rules, such as Section 8(a) of the German corporate income tax law (KStG),
typically limit interest deduction up to a fixed relation between equity and
internal debt, i.e. the interest paid for an excess leverage cannot be deducted
from the tax base.
The German thin-capitalization rule only applies to foreign affiliates that
are incorporated.1 First-tier foreign partnerships are not affected by the
restriction and constitute a suitable non-treatment group when looking at
legal amendments of this rule as natural experiments. The rule classifies
two different types of incorporated companies. The first group of companies
comprises ordinary corporations, which are not classified as holdings. For the
purposes of this law, a holding is defined as a firm where more than 75% of
1One exemption would be the German rule introduced in 2004, which applies to cases
in which a second-tier partnership is held by incorporated foreign affiliates. We do not
consider these cases in our analysis.
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total assets consist of shares in other corporations. For ordinary corporations,
the allowed internal-debt-to-equity ratio, called safe haven, was accepted at
3:1 before 2001. Yet the safe haven internal-debt-to-equity ratio was 9:1 in
the case of a holding corporation, and therefore, holdings could still be used
as loopholes. In 2001 and 2004, two important amendments of the German
thin-capitalization rule were introduced. In 2001, the allowed internal-debt-
to-equity ratios were significantly reduced to 1.5:1 in the case of an ordinary
corporation and to 3:1 in the case of a holding corporation. Nevertheless, a
possible loophole in terms of holding corporations remained. In 2004, this
special rule for holding corporations was also abolished, and the safe haven
was generally constituted at 1.5:1 for every corporation. However, first-tier
partnerships were not affected by these amendments.
To illustrate the change in the thin-capitalization rule, let us consider the
following example. A German holding corporation has used internal debt
as a source of finance, with an internal-debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1 in 2000.
This corporation was allowed to deduct interest payments without restric-
tion. Following the 2001 tax reform, the accepted ratio was reduced to 3:1.
As a consequence, the corporation was no longer able to deduct interest pay-
ments for 5 percentage points of its debt-to-equity share. Nevertheless, the
corporation was not prohibited from maintaining its internal-debt-to-equity
ratio. It is important to bear in mind, however, that not every corporation
(irrespective of its legal form) is affected by a stricter thin-capitalization rule.
It is highly possible that many firms fall below the accepted internal-debt-
to-equity relation anyway. We will come back to this point in Section 2.6,
discussing the implications for the estimated coefficients.
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2.3 A Model
We explain the impact of company taxation on the choice of debt or equity as
a subsidiary’s source of finance by the following simple model. We consider
a firm with two separate entities, of which the parent company is denoted
by 1 and the subsidiary by 2. If the parent company and the subsidiary are
completely financed with equity, profits are determined by
pi = f(k1)(1− t1) + f(k2)(1− t2)− r(k1 + k2).
k1 and k2 denote invested capital, f(kj) output at location j, t1 and t2 the
statutory tax rates at the respective locations. The opportunity costs of
own capital are r(k1 + k2). Note that an exemption system of repatriated
foreign profits is assumed.2 The parent company can decide on the type of
capital that is used to finance the subsidiary. Instead of equity, the parent
company can provide capital by means of an internal loan. We denote the
share of capital that is financed by such an internal loan as µ2 and the
internal interest rate as i2. Interest payments i2µ2 can be deducted for tax
purposes by the borrowing subsidiary 2. Simultaneously, interest payments
are taxed at the lending company. The tax consequences of an internal credit
are then i2µ2k2(t
i
2 − t1), where ti2 is the tax rate avoided because of interest
deduction. This tax rate can differ from the statutory company tax rate
if interest payments are not fully deductible from corporate income. For
2This is true for most European countries and Canada. The effect of a credit system
equals an exemption system if t2 > t1. Otherwise, the affiliate’s tax rate increases to t1,
depending on the time of retention. Yet the general incentives remain if foreign profits are
not distributed immediately.
Chapter 2 – Corporate Tax Planning and Thin-Capitalization Rules 47
instance, in Germany only half of all interest payments can be deducted for
local income tax purposes, and thus, ti2 < t2.
Moreover, we assume that internal loans are associated with additional costs,
for example agency costs, because of asymmetric information (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Furthermore, there are non-tax reasons to
use internal debt such as short-term cash management between parent and
affiliate or the opportunity to control the local management through fixed
annual interest payments (Jensen, 1986). We consider cost and utility of in-
ternal debt and introduce a convex cost function c2(µ2),
3 as well as a concave
utility function g2(µ2).
4 Subsequently, the profit function of the firm can be
described as
pi = f(k1)(1− t1) + f(k2)(1− t2)− r(k1 + k2) (2.1)
+ [i2µ2(t
i
2 − t1)− c2(µ2) + g2(µ2)]k2.
Obviously, the transition of equity into internal debt implies a direct profit
shift from the borrowing affiliate 2 to the lending parent company 1 if the
tax rate of the borrowing affiliate is higher than the tax rate of the lender.
The tax-rate differential between both locations creates incentives to use
equity refinanced internal debt as a source of finance. This implies that
profits are shifted to the lending affiliate. Jurisdictions attempt to counteract
these activities by imposing restrictions, for example thin-capitalization rules,
which typically limit interest deduction. Consequently, interest paid for an
3 dc2/dµ2 > 0, d2c2/dµ22 > 0.
4 dg2/dµ2 > 0, d2g2/dµ22 < 0.
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excess leverage cannot be deducted from the tax base if µj is above a certain
fixed µj. We now assume that country 2 introduces such a rule, denoted by
ϕ2, where ϕ2 = 1 if the rule is effectively binding and 0 otherwise. Whether
the rule is binding for an affiliate depends on the difference between the actual
internal-debt ratio and the maximum accepted, i.e. whether a company is
above the threshold level or not, and how the type of internal debt is classified
for tax purposes. Note that ϕ2 is always 0 if µ2 < µ2. We extend the profit
function by the additional tax payments arising from excess leverage above
the thin-capitalization rule limit:
−i2(µ2 − µ2)ti2ϕ2k2.
The profit function becomes
pi = f(k1)(1− t1) + f(k2)(1− t2)− r(k1 + k2) (2.2)
+ [i2µ2(t
i
2 − t1)− i2(µ2 − µ2)ti2ϕ2 − c2(µ2) + g2(µ2)]k2.
The optimal share of internal debt of subsidiary 2 financed by parent equity
is obtained by the following first-order condition
i2(t
i
2 − t1 − ti2ϕ2) + g2,µ(µ2)− c2,µ(µ2) != 0. (2.3)
First, we consider the case without application of a thin-capitalization rule.
Accordingly, the share of internal debt is determined by the tax-rate differ-
ence between the borrowing affiliate and the parent company (ti2 − t1). The
internal lending rate can be used to leverage the tax effect. Yet the interest
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rate is not likely to constitute an important degree of freedom, as the arm’s
length principle easily applies.
Secondly, we consider cases where the thin-capitalization rule is applied. If
ϕ2 becomes 1, any tax incentive to use internal debt is effectively stopped. In
this case, only the tax-rate level at the location of the lending parent has an
impact. Additionally, internal debt used for non-tax reasons becomes more
expensive, because internal interest payments are taxed twice. Assuming a
binding case, this is an incentive to reduce µ2 in order to avoid enforcement
of the thin-capitalization rule.
We can derive comparative static properties by differentiating the first-order
condition:
− i2dt1 + [i2 − i2ϕ2]dti2 + [ti2 − t1 − ti2ϕ2]di2 = [c2,µµ(µ2)− g2,µµ(µ2)]dµ2.
First, let us consider the effect of an increasing tax rate at the lending com-
pany’s location on the share of internal debt used by its affiliate.5 The
derivative equals
dµ2
dt1
=
−i2
c2,µµ(µ2)− g2,µµ(µ2) < 0. (2.4)
This expression is always negative: internal debt used by an affiliate decreases
with an increasing tax rate at the parent’s location. With regard to the
5We assume a zero marginal tax-rate effect on the internal interest rate i2. This is
a reasonable assumption, because the arm’s length principle is easily applied to interest
rates.
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marginal effect of an increasing tax rate at the affiliate’s location we obtain
dµ2
dti2
=
i2 − i2ϕ2
c2,µµ(µ2)− g2,µµ(µ2) ≥ 0. (2.5)
This expression is positive when the thin-capitalization rule is not enforced
(ϕ = 0). Otherwise, if the share of internal debt is above the limits (ϕ = 1),
a tax rate increase has no effect on the optimal share of internal debt. This
can be explained by the fact that interest payments for the excessive debt
cannot be deducted for tax purposes. Higher internal borrowing must be
due to non-tax reasons, e.g. short-term cash management. Accordingly, a
tax-rate variation does not matter for the optimal µ2 in this case. To sum
up, the following proposition can be set up:
Proposition 1: The optimal share of internal debt should increase with an
increasing tax rate at the subsidiary’s location and decrease with an increasing
tax rate at the parent’s location. Hence, if the share of internal debt is tax
driven, it should increase with an increasing tax-rate difference (ti2 − t1).
Finally, let us consider a reform of the thin-capitalization rule. Germany
significantly reduced the safe haven in 2001 and 2004, respectively. We ex-
ploit these reforms to obtain exogenous variation in one crucial explanatory
variable. Given any distribution of µ, a stricter thin-capitalization rule is as-
sociated with more companies above the lower threshold level. A reduction
of µ2 increases the number of cases for which ϕ2 becomes one because the
rule is binding and enforced. Equation (2.3) implies that tax incentives to
use internal debt decrease. In this case, the firm reduces its debt share below
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the new threshold level and prefers equity as the marginal source of finance.
Proposition 2 follows:
Proposition 2: If internal debt is a channel for shifting taxable profits,
and thin-capitalization rules can limit tax-planning behavior, a reduction of
the allowed debt-to-equity ratio implies smaller shares of internal borrow-
ing. Non-incorporated companies, which are not treated by the German thin-
capitalization rule and its amendments, do not reduce their share of internal
debt.
2.4 Empirical Implications
We test the above propositions empirically by using German inbound FDI
data. A simple estimation approach to test Proposition 1 could be a regres-
sion of the internal-debt ratio ID of an investment in country G (Germany)
taken by firm k located in country j in period t on the tax-rate differential
(STRG,t − STRj,t) and on some company-specific characteristics xk,j,t. A
simple regression equation would be
IDk,j,t = a0 + a1(STRG,t − STRj,t) + a2xk,j,t + ak + at + ²IDk,j,t, (2.6)
where ak is a company-specific effect to control for heterogeneity between
company groups. Furthermore, we control for German capital market con-
straints or aggregate shocks by a time-specific effect at. Note that we are
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able to identify tax-rate effects because of cross-country and time variation in
STRj,t. Following Proposition 1, we expect a positive sign of the tax differen-
tial coefficient a1 on ID. For internal debt, which is refinanced by equity, the
local interest rate at the lending parent location should be irrelevant. Only
the German lending rate could be of importance, as it is used as the arm’s
length benchmark by the German tax authority. We implicitly control for
the German lending rate by time effects at, because every inbound investor
faces the same lending rate. The two reforms in 2001 and 2004 constitute
exogenous sources of variation, unambiguously affecting the average value of
our dependent variable for some groups. We can therefore test Proposition
2 by using a difference-in-differences approach (see, e.g., Meyer, 1995).
Different amendments of the German thin-capitalization rule have consti-
tuted three groups with different degrees of treatment. We use a dummy
variable DTGROUP to denote the respective treatment group, i.e. the corpo-
rations which were treated by a specific amendment of the thin-capitalization
rule in 2001 or 2004. Additionally, we use a dummy variable Dpost to indicate
the post-amendment observations from 2001 to 2004. Thus, an estimation
equation for the 2001 reform effect can be described as
IDk,j,t = b0 + b1(STRG,t − STRj,t) + b2xk,j,t (2.7)
+ b3DTGROUP + b4DDTGROUPDpost
+ bk + bt + ²
ID
k,j,t.
The treatment group consists of both ordinary corporations and holding
corporations. It is important to bear in mind that partnerships were not
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treated by the German thin-capitalization rule and constitute a suitable non-
treatment group of the reform in 2001. Group-independent time trends are
absorbed by bt. Therefore, we implicitly control for yearly variations in Ger-
man tax rates. The treatment effect is measured by b4, where we expect
a negative sign. Furthermore, for the 2004 reform effect, we propose the
following equation
IDk,j,t = c0 + c1(STRG,t − STRj,t) + c2xk,j,t (2.8)
+ c3DTGROUP + c4DDTGROUPD2004
+ ck + ct + ²
ID
k,j,t,
where only holding corporations were treated by the reform of the thin-
capitalization rule. Therefore, all other companies, incorporated and non-
incorporated, constitute the non-treatment group. We also expect a negative
sign of the treatment effect c4.
To sum up, the legal reforms enable us to test whether a thin-capitalization
rule is effectively imposed. The tax reform of 2001 only hit ordinary incor-
porated firms as well as holding companies. Partnerships, however, were not
affected. In 2004, only holding corporations were affected. We argue that
groups are comparable, because we observe only affiliates of multinationals.
In other words, we look at firms which have the same opportunities with
respect to internal finance, for example. Furthermore, we control for differ-
ences across single investments, for instance, by using the affiliate-specific
sales as a control variable. We additionally assume that there are no system-
atic changes in within- and between-group compositions. In fact, the group
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sizes are almost stable over time. To identify the effect on the treated com-
panies, a further critical assumption is that all groups are equally affected
by aggregate shocks.
2.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis uses the MiDi database for multinationals provided
by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This is a comprehensive annual micro data-
base of investment positions of German enterprises held abroad as well as
of investment positions held in Germany by foreign companies. The data
provide information about the investment object’s balance sheet, including
further information on the type of investment and on the investor. A favor-
able characteristic of the data is that it provides the possibility of tracing
observations of individual firms over time. The current version provides
affiliate-level panel data for the period 1996 to 2004. The collection of the
data is enforced by German law, which sets reporting obligations for certain
international transactions and positions.6
The database comprises direct and indirect FDI positions above a certain
threshold level. Given that the model deals with a simple two-tier com-
6Sec. 26 Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (Trade and Payments Act) in connection with Außen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation). Since 2002, FDI has to
be reported if the participation is 10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the foreign
investment in Germany is above 3 million Euro. For details, see Lipponer (2006). Though
previous years showed lower thresholds, we apply this level uniformly for all years in the
panel.
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pany structure, indirectly held investments are excluded. Moreover, we only
keep observations with a nonzero internal-debt ratio. Table 2.1 displays the
number of observations in our sample, the country-specific mean values of
the share of non-German internal debt, the average country-specific tax-rate
differentials, and the average number of investment objects. Investors are
mainly from Germany’s neighboring countries, e.g., from Switzerland, the
Netherlands, or from France. Of course, investors from other big economies
such as Japan or the USA are also strongly represented. According to the
model, we define the dependent variable ID as internal debt borrowed from
the foreign parent company relative to total capital. To control for company-
specific variation in the accession to external debt, we employ the affiliate’s
sales as an indicator for size and cash flow in our regression analysis (see, e.g.,
Panno, 2003). We expect a negative effect of higher sales when external and
internal debt serve as substitutes (see Buettner et al., 2006). As agency costs
and the utility of internal debt may also vary across industries, we control
for further heterogeneity by including dummies for 56 industries at the level
of the affiliate.
The statutory tax-rate differential constitutes the relevant measure for in-
vestigating the tax impact on the use of internal debt. The variable STRG
contains German statutory profit tax rates;7 foreign statutory tax rates
are denoted by STRF . We use these two tax measures to construct bi-
lateral tax-rate differences. Since the effective tax reduction from using debt
7Our measure takes into account that only half of all interest payments can be deducted
from the tax base of the German trade income tax. Furthermore, we consider the national
average of the local trade income tax.
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Table 2.1: German Inbound FDI (1996 – 2004)
Home Number of Internal Tax Rate Number of
Country Observations Debt Ratio Difference Investments
Australia 33 .358 .021 4
Austria 1,245 .240 .019 139
Belgium 564 .284 -.033 64
Canada 162 .280 -.063 19
Cyprus 21 .215 .130 3
Czech Republic 40 .340 .019 5
Denmark 745 .284 .040 83
Finland 189 .345 .077 22
France 1,988 .249 -.014 223
Great Britain 1,276 .270 .051 144
Greece a) a) a) a)
Hungary 39 .367 .158 5
Iceland a) a) a) a)
Ireland 63 .488 .251 8
Italy 905 .281 -.069 101
Japan 2,257 .339 -.100 252
Korea (South) 165 .393 .056 21
Lithuania a) a) a) a)
Luxembourg 388 .235 .001 44
Mexico 12 .138 .014 a)
Netherlands 2,429 .281 .010 273
Norway 177 .279 .078 21
Poland 30 .212 .042 3
Portugal 25 .281 .038 3
Slovakia a) a) a) a)
Slovenia 75 .221 .109 9
Spain 300 .211 -.043 35
Sweden 565 .249 .076 64
Switzerland 2,725 .276 .112 306
Turkey 51 .316 -.013 6
USA 2,880 .280 -.051 330
Total 19,379 .280 .003 2,195
Source: MiDi. The table shows the per-country apportionment of parent companies for German inward
FDI from 1996 until 2004. Internal-debt ratios are country-specific mean values, determined by the level of
balance-sheet liabilities divided by total capital. The table also shows average statutory tax-rate differences
between Germany and respective foreign locations, as well as the yearly average number of investments.
a) Not reported due to data protection (because the number of observations is too small).
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might be zero if a subsidiary carries forward any losses for tax purposes
(MacKie-Mason, 1990; Francois, 2006), we include a dummy variable indi-
cating whether some loss carry-forward is reported. Of course, the existence
of losses in the previous periods may capture other characteristics of the cur-
rent decision problem of the company such as the expected performance of
an affiliate. Thus, the overall effect on internal leverage is ambiguous. Table
2.2 displays basic information about the regression variables.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ID (share of internal debt from .280 .262 .001 .992
foreign parent company)
STRG - STRF (tax-rate difference) .003 .072 -.152 .281
STRF (foreign tax rate) .354 .071 .100 .532
Loss carry-forward (binary variable) .431 .495 0 1
Sales (sales in e1,000) 65,088 247,678 1,000 11,000,000
Source: MiDi. Observations: 19,379. Minimum and maximum values are averages of the 3 smallest
(highest) values, reported as average values for confidentiality reasons.
2.6 Empirical Results
The empirical analysis involves panel data regressions that include company
fixed effects. Thereby, we generally control for all time-constant heterogene-
ity between company groups. First of all, it is worth mentioning that all
regressions show the expected tax rate effect. Specification (2) in Table 2.3
indicates, for example, that a 10 percentage point increase in the tax-rate
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differential between Germany and any other country is associated with a 1.9
percentage point higher internal-debt ratio. The magnitude of the tax effect
is in line with earlier findings (see, e.g., Desai et al., 2004, or Buettner et al.,
2006). With regard to the effect of the German thin-capitalization reform
in 2001, we control for systematic differences in the control and treatment
group by introducing a treatment-group dummy variable DTGROUP . First,
we do not distinguish between different treatment groups in Specifications
(3)-(5) of Table 2.3. While we interact the treatment group with a post-
reform dummy Dpost for the whole period of 2001 until 2004 in Column (3),
we control for each single year in Columns (4) and (5). In Column (3), we
observe that the treated group (holdings and incorporated firms) responds
to the tighter thin-capitalization rule, and internal debt is reduced in the
post-reform period. Columns (4) and (5) show that the reform was by no
means anticipated. Rather, it took the companies 1 year to reduce their
internal-debt ratios. This is possibly the result of a restructuring process
which started in 2001.
A company is only affected if the thin-capitalization rule is binding (the
firm’s internal-debt-to-equity ratio is above the maximally accepted ratio).
In this case, the tax-planning firm should re-optimize its capital structure
after the reform if the construction so far has been optimal. Nevertheless,
given the continuum of internal-debt-to-equity ratios, not all corporations
are affected. Consequently, the treatment effect would be much stronger if
all treated corporations were noticeably affected. In Table 2.4, we split the
sample into different treatment groups. As already mentioned, we have two
treatment groups for the 2001 reform (holdings and ordinary incorporated
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Table 2.3: Thin-Capitalization Reform in 2001 (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STRg – STRf .188 ∗∗ .192 ∗∗ .206 ∗∗ .207 ∗∗∗ .214 ∗∗∗
(.088) (.088) (.087) (.087) (.088)
Dtgroup .001 .002 .018
(.019) (.019) (.020)
Dtgroup × Dpost -.025 ∗∗
(.010)
Dtgroup × 1997 -.006
(.018)
Dtgroup × 1998 -.016
(.019)
Dtgroup × 1999 -.025
(.017)
Dtgroup × 2000 -.024
(.018)
Dtgroup × 2001 -.004 -.021
(.012) (.020)
Dtgroup × 2002 -.036 ∗∗ -.052 ∗∗
(.015) (.023)
Dtgroup × 2003 -.032 ∗∗ -.049 ∗∗
(.011) (.020)
Dtgroup × 2004 -.038 ∗∗ -.054 ∗∗
(.016) (.023)
1997 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.003 .003
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.017)
1998 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 .013
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.017)
1999 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.002 .022
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.016)
2000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 .022
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.017)
2001 .002 .002 .025 ∗∗∗ .006 .022
(.005) (.005) (.011) (.012) (.019)
2002 -.011 -.010 .013 .023 .038
(.006) (.007) (.011) (.015) (.021)
2003 -.024 ∗∗∗ -.024 ∗∗∗ -.001 .006 .020
(.006) (.006) (.010) (.011) (.018)
2004 -.022 ∗∗∗ -.022 ∗∗∗ .001 .013 .028
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.016) (.021)
ln(Sales) -.016 ∗∗∗ -.015 ∗∗∗ -.015 ∗∗∗ -.015 ∗∗∗ -.015 ∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Loss carry-forward .009 .009 .009 .009
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Observations 19,379 19,379 19,379 19,379 19,379
Adj. R2 .711 .711 .711 .711 .711
Source: MiDi. The dependent variable is the share of internal loans borrowed from the foreign parent
company. Robust and clustered (country/year clusters) standard errors are in parentheses. Two stars
denote significance at 5% and three stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 5,257 company
and 56 industry fixed effects.
Chapter 2 – Corporate Tax Planning and Thin-Capitalization Rules 60
Table 2.4: Thin-Capitalization Reform in 2001 (II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
STRg – STRf .201 ∗∗ .216 ∗∗ .224 ∗∗ .783 ∗∗∗ .750 ∗∗∗ .737 ∗∗∗
(.089) (.088) (.090) (.287) (.288) (.294)
Dtgroup .003 .019 .019 .100
(.019) (.020) (.074) (.084)
Dtgroup × Dpost -.025 ∗∗ -.101 ∗∗∗
(.010) (.018)
Dtgroup × 1997 -.006 -.044
(.018) (.028)
Dtgroup × 1998 -.017 -.017
(.019) (.035)
Dtgroup × 1999 -.026 -.036
(.017) (.032)
Dtgroup × 2000 -.024 -.085 ∗∗
(.018) (.034)
Dtgroup × 2001 -.020 -.125 ∗∗
(.020) (.038)
Dtgroup × 2002 -.053 ∗∗ -.151 ∗∗
(.023) (.041)
Dtgroup × 2003 -.050 ∗∗ -.193 ∗∗
(.020) (.042)
Dtgroup × 2004 -.052 ∗∗ -.221 ∗∗
(.023) (.046)
1997 -.002 -.002 .003 -.006 -.006 .003
(.006) (.006) (.017) (.014) (.015) (.019)
1998 -.002 -.002 .013 .007 .006 .009
(.006) (.006) (.017) (.013) (.014) (.018)
1999 -.002 -.002 .022 .019 .015 .020
(.005) (.005) (.016) (.013) (.014) (.018)
2000 -.000 -.000 .022 .008 .000 .016
(.006) (.006) (.017) (.015) (.015) (.019)
2001 .003 .026 ∗∗ .022 .026 .040 .040
(.006) (.011) (.019) (.020) (.020) (.023)
2002 -.010 .013 .039 .034 .046 ∗∗ .051 ∗∗
(.007) (.011) (.021) (.020) (.021) (.024)
2003 -.024 ∗∗∗ -.002 .021 .006 .018 .031
(.006) (.011) (.018) (.017) (.018) (.021)
2004 .019 ∗∗∗ .003 .028 .018 .029 ∗∗∗ .048
(.007) (.012) (.021) (.020) (.020) (.025)
ln(Sales) -.014 ∗∗∗ -.014 ∗∗∗ -.014 ∗∗∗ -.019 ∗∗∗ -.017 ∗∗ -.018 ∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Loss carry-forward .009 .009 .009 -.011 -.013 -.014
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.015) (.014) (.014)
Observations 18,787 18,787 18,787 2,196 2,196 2,196
Adj. R2 .714 .714 .714 .806 .810 .811
Source: MiDi. The dependent variable is the share of internal loans borrowed from the foreign parent
company. Specifications (1) - (3) are based on a sample of ordinary corporations and partnerships. Speci-
fications (4) - (6) are based on a sample which consists of holding corporations and partnerships. Robust
and clustered (country/year clusters) standard errors are in parentheses. Two stars denote significance at
5% and three stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 5,105/738 company and 56 industry
fixed effects.
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Table 2.5: Thin-Capitalization Reform in 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STRg – STRf .192 ∗∗ .193 ∗∗ .406 ∗∗ .410 ∗∗
(.088) (.088) (.201) (.200)
Dtgroup .050 ∗∗ .026
(.020) (.024)
Dtgroup × D2004 -.068 ∗∗ -.042 ∗∗
(.021) (.019)
1997 -.003 -.003
(.005) (.005)
1998 -.002 -.002
(.006) (.006)
1999 -.001 -.001
(.005) (.005)
2000 -.000 -.000
(.006) (.006)
2001 .002 .002
(.005) (.006)
2002 -.010 -.011 -.014 ∗∗∗ -.014 ∗∗∗
(.007) (.007) (.004) (.004)
2003 -.024 ∗∗∗ -.024 ∗∗∗ -.034 ∗∗∗ -.035 ∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.005)
2004 -.022 ∗∗∗ -.020 ∗∗∗ -.029 ∗∗∗ -.028 ∗∗∗
(.007) (.007) (.005) (.005)
ln(Sales) -.015 ∗∗∗ -.015 ∗∗∗ -.009 -.009
(.004) (.004) (.007) (.007)
Loss carry-forward .009 .009 .026 ∗∗ .026 ∗∗
(.005) (.005) (.010) (.010)
Observations 19,379 19,379 7,980 7,980
Adj. R2 .711 .712 .773 .773
Source: MiDi. The dependent variable is the share of internal loans borrowed
from the foreign parent company. Specifications (1) - (2) are based on the
whole sample, (3) and (4) are based on a sample in which only observations
from 2001 until 2004 are considered. Robust and clustered (country/year
clusters) standard errors are in parentheses. Two stars denote significance
at 5% and three stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of
5,257/3,196 company and 56 industry fixed effects.
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companies). The results are generally comparable, apart from the fact that
the number of observations is reduced.8 Specifications (1) to (3) consider or-
dinary corporations as the treatment group and partnerships as the control
group. Specifications (4) to (6) investigate the tax effects on internal debt
of holding corporations (partnerships again constitute the control group).
One major insight from Table 2.4 is that holdings adapt their capital struc-
ture much faster than ordinary incorporated companies. The restructuring
process is possibly easier, and therefore faster for some reason. Moreover, the
threshold level was reduced more severely for holding corporations. Another
reason might be the potential role of holding corporations as special tax-
planning entities. The magnitude of the treatment effect can be interpreted
as follows. For holding corporations, the 2001 thin-capitalization reform
induced a decline in the share of internal debt borrowed from the foreign
parent company of about 10 percentage points. This equals a reduction of
approx. one-third, considering a pre-reform mean of 31.7% internal debt to
total capital.
Finally, we focus on the effect of the German thin-capitalization reform in
2004. This reform applied to holding corporations only. The control group
consists of all other legal forms. The results in Table 2.5 show once more
that some companies restructure, basically those which were affected by the
stricter rule, and reduce their share of internal debt. Specifications (1) and
(2) are based on observations from 1996 to 2004. Regressions in Columns
(3) and (4) are only based on observations from 2001 to 2004, in order to
8Note that the group sizes are relatively constant for the 9 years in the sample.
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avoid confounding effects of the first thin-capitalization reform in 2001. The
magnitude of the 2004 reform effect is much lower compared to the 2001
reform. Here, the share of internal debt is reduced by approx. 4.2 percentage
points. This equals a reduction of about one-sixth, given the pre-reform level
of 26% internal debt to total capital.
2.7 Conclusions and Implications
We find that international tax-rate differentials play an important role in
determining the share of internal lending to German affiliates. This confirms
earlier results provided by other studies. The important insight provided by
our empirical analysis is that German thin-capitalization rules are effectively
imposed. A reduction of the allowed debt-to-equity ratios, enforced by re-
forms in 2001 and 2004, respectively, induced significantly smaller shares of
internal debt from incorporated companies.
Finally, we focus on revenue effects. Although we cannot estimate how much
revenue Germany would lose in the absence of a thin-capitalization rule,
rough estimations of the reform effects can be provided. First of all, we con-
sider Specifications (3) and (6) from Table 2.4. In 2002, the 2001 reform
is associated with lower internal-debt-to-capital ratios of approx. 0.053 for
ordinary corporations and approx. 0.151 for holding corporations. Given the
respective mean values, Germany was able to retain additional tax revenue
averaging e71,700 per ordinary corporation and e1,807,000 per holding cor-
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poration in additional tax revenue by tightening the thin-capitalization rule.9
Considering the number of treated corporations, we estimate an amount of
approx. e260 million in additional tax revenue. Secondly, using Specification
(4) of Table 2.5, we estimate the additional tax revenue to be up to approx.
e30 million for the reform in 2004. The total amount might be higher due
to the treatment of indirectly held foreign affiliates or because other debt
types are also treated. Moreover, the internal lending rate is not necessarily
equivalent to the local lending rate. All estimated magnitudes can only be
rough estimates, and we cannot take into account that multinationals – in
event of restrictions on their capital structure choice – are able to shift profits
through other channels, for instance, by transfer-price setting.
With respect to the effectiveness of thin-capitalization rules, our results sug-
gest that governments are able to restrict tax-planning activities. Restricting
corporations in shifting profits, however, can raise costs of finance, and hence,
cause adverse investment effects. This trade-off presents new challenges and
opportunities for future research.
9We assume as price for the internal credit a German lending rate for credits to the
private sector of 9.7% in 2002 (IMF, 2005), and the 2002 statutory tax rate of 32.88%.
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Data Sources and Definitions
Affiliate-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset of the Bundesbank
(see Lipponer, 2006, for an overview). The share of internal debt from the
foreign parent company is determined by the level of balance-sheet liabilities
in the respective category divided by total capital consisting of registered
capital, capital reserves and profit reserves, as well as internal and external
debt. Corporate taxation data are taken from the IBFD and from tax surveys
provided by the tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes how multinational enterprises respond to a restric-
tion on interest deductions incurred for internal borrowing. The emphasis
of the study is on a firm’s response with respect to external borrowing. The
empirical investigation applies propensity score matching techniques and ex-
ploits the 2001 reform of the German thin-capitalization rule to solve endo-
geneity problems. The results suggest that restrictions on internal debt are
associated with expansions in external debt finance, indicating a substitu-
tional relationship. Since multinational enterprises can use internal debt to
shift profits from high- to low-tax countries, this finding implies that policies
aimed at securing corporate tax revenue possibly fail and should be subject
to careful scrutiny by policymakers.
3.1 Introduction
Once corporate income taxation is introduced in models of capital structure
choice, a firm can increase its value by using debt instead of equity finance,
making use of interest deductions. This is one essential finding of the cor-
porate finance literature (for surveys, see Graham, 2003; Myers, 2001). A
firm’s capital structure choice, however, involves not only the debt-equity
decision. Some companies also have the choice between internal and external
debt finance. In the context of multinational firms, for instance, this choice
entails complex issues of international tax planning.
Several existing empirical research papers consider both internal and external
debt and find that corporate debt policy reflects differences in international
taxation (e.g., Desai et al., 2004a; Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2005; Ramb
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and Weichenrieder, 2005). If multinational enterprises use internal loans to
shift profits from high- to low-tax countries, high-tax countries lose corporate
tax revenue. As a consequence, many governments have focused attention
on countermeasures such as thin-capitalization rules which restrict the de-
ductibility of interest expenses associated with internal debt. For example,
from 1996 to 2005, the number of EU member countries that relied on some
form of debt-equity restriction increased from 8 to 17. Only recently, the is-
sue has appeared on the agenda of the European Commission, as “[...] there
is clearly a perceived need for the introduction of a common thin capitaliza-
tion rule.” (Dourado and de la Feria, 2008, p.1). It is questionable, however,
whether European countries will agree on harmonizing thin-capitalization
rules in the near future, because a common rule may reduce welfare in some
countries (see Haufler and Runkel, 2008).
In a recent study, Buettner et al. (2008) find that thin-capitalization rules are
effective in restricting internal borrowing. Overesch and Wamser (2008) con-
firm this result by investigating a reform of the German thin-capitalization
rule. However, whether corporate tax revenue simultaneously goes up re-
mains unclear. In fact, the analyses of Desai et al. (2004a) and Ruf (2008)
suggest that internal and external debt are substitutes, and thus, tax revenue
may be unaffected. If firms are able to substitute external for internal debt,
they still make use of interest deduction, because external debt is usually not
affected by thin-capitalization rules. While consequences for corporate tax
revenues ultimately depend on the elasticity of substitution between exter-
nal and internal debt, on interest costs for external debt and, in the medium
term, on firms’ investment response, the goal of securing the domestic cor-
porate tax base possibly fails in the first place.
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This paper investigates how a firm’s external debt usage responds to restric-
tions on internal borrowing. Thereby, the analysis also reveals how internal
debt generally relates to external debt. Any investigation of this relationship
is challenging, because firms simultaneously decide on both internal and ex-
ternal debt. To obtain reliable estimates, we therefore make use of a more
sophisticated identification strategy, where we first exploit a reform of the
German thin-capitalization rule. Second, we adopt a counterfactual perspec-
tive and apply propensity score matching methods. The analysis is based on
an affiliate-level database on foreign direct investment in Germany (inbound
FDI), provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (the German Central Bank).
The findings support the hypothesis that affiliates of foreign multinationals
partially substitute external for internal borrowing if they are affected by a
tighter thin-capitalization rule. The estimations imply that affected firms
increase their external-debt-to-capital ratio by approx. 2.5 percentage points
compared to the counterfactual outcome. With regard to the external debt
level, we estimate an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) that
suggests that treated firms expand their external debt usage by 8%. These
findings imply a limited effectiveness of thin-capitalization rules in terms of
shielding tax revenue.
The study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides institutional details
about the German thin-capitalization rule. Some theoretical considerations
are presented in Section 3.3. The empirical investigation approach is devel-
oped in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes the data. Section 3.6 reports and
interprets the results. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 The German Thin-Capitalization Rule
While multinational firms can use their internal capital markets for a number
of reasons – for instance to overcome shortcomings associated with external
credit markets (e.g., Desai et al., 2004a) – internal financial policies can also
support multinationals’ efforts in reducing their overall tax liabilities. In a
very simple scenario, in which a multinational firm is active in a low- and a
high-tax country, we would expect the subsidiary in the high-tax country to
borrow from the subsidiary in the low-tax country. Since interest payments
are usually deductible from the corporate tax base, the difference in national
statutory tax rates determines the potential gain (see, e.g., Buettner and
Wamser, 2007).
To secure their corporate tax bases, many countries have introduced some
form of debt-equity restriction. Referring to excessive debt-to-equity ratios,
i.e. companies are thinly capitalized, such restrictions are commonly known
as thin-capitalization rules. In Germany, a thin-capitalization rule was first
introduced in 1994. After having been subject to amendments in 2001 and
2004, it was replaced by a so-called earnings-stripping rule in 2008 (see also
Section 3.7). Up to and including 2007, Section 8(a) of the German corporate
income tax law (KStG) limited interest deduction if a firm’s internal-debt-
to-equity ratio exceeded a certain threshold level. The rule applied to two
different types of incorporated affiliates. The first group of affiliates included
ordinary corporations that were not classified as holding companies. For
these corporations, interest deduction was allowed up to an internal-debt-
Chapter 3 – The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt 73
to-equity ratio (equity inclusive of internal debt) of 3:1 before 2001. The
threshold level for holdings – defined as a firm where more than 75% of total
assets consist of shares in other corporations – was even less restrictive at an
internal-debt-to-equity ratio of 9:1. In 2001, the thresholds were significantly
reduced to 1.5:1 in the case of an ordinary corporation and to 3:1 in the case
of a holding corporation. Note that if the internal-debt-to-equity ratio of a
firm was in excess of the threshold defined by the thin-capitalization rule,
only interest expenses for the internal borrowing above the allowed threshold
were non-deductible.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
Corporate financial decisions are a relevant aspect of firm policy affecting
the value of a company (for surveys, see Auerbach, 2002; Graham, 2003).
Nevertheless, investigations on capital structures typically start from the
Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem. Assuming a frictionless capital mar-
ket, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) result states that the capital structure is
irrelevant for the company value. In the presence of taxes, however, com-
panies would generally favor debt, because the debt tax shield generated by
debt interest deductions increases the company value (Modigliani and Miller,
1963).1
1The irrelevance theorem is no longer valid in the presence of various capital market
imperfections (see Fama, 1978, for a discussion of the Modigliani-Miller assumptions).
Kemsley and Nissim (2002) estimate the value of the debt tax shield. Their findings
suggest that the debt tax shield is equal to approx. 40% of debt balances, or 10% of total
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The following model considers two multinational enterprises (A and B). Each
multinational has a subsidiary in Germany. The subsidiaries are identical,
except that one is affected by the reform of the German thin-capitalization
rule (subsidiary of multinational B), the other is not (subsidiary of multina-
tional A).
3.3.1 Multinational Firm A
Consider a multinational firm A which is active in a parent country (coun-
try 1) and in Germany (country 2). The multinational’s after-tax profits are
given by
piA = f
(
kA1
)
(1− t1) + f
(
kA2
)
(1− t2) (3.1)
− [i1λA1 kA1 ] (1− t1)
− [i2λA2 kA2 ] (1− t2)
+
[
i2µ
A
2 k
A
2
]
(t2 − t1)
− [(1− λA1 ) kA1 + (1− λA2 ) kA2 ] rA
− [c (λA1 ) kA1 + c (λA2 , µA2 ) kA2 ] .
Output is given by the production functions f
(
kA1
)
and f
(
kA2
)
, where kA1
units of capital are employed at the parent’s location, and kA2 units of capital
in Germany. The firm is subject to the corporate tax rates t1 and t2. The
firm value. Graham (2000) estimates that the tax benefit of debt equals 9.7% of firm
value.
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relevant interest rates are given by i1 and i2. The second and the third
line capture the net-of-tax interest costs related to external debt, where λA1
and λA2 denote the respective shares of capital financed with external debt.
2
Moreover, let µA2 be the share of internal debt provided by the parent firm.
If we assume that Germany is always the high-tax country (t2 > t1), the
multinational can increase piA by shifting profits from the high-tax affiliate to
the low-tax parent firm. Note that internal loans are equity refinanced and do
not increase external debt. The fourth line captures the multinational’s cost
of equity, where the rate of return on equity is denoted by rA. Finally, c(λA1 )
and c(λA2 , µ
A
2 ) are the cost of borrowing.
3 The cost function is assumed to
be convex in both types of debt.4 Furthermore, if the cross-partial derivative
is positive, external and internal debt are substitutes.5 The firm chooses λA2
and µA2 to maximize profits, which yields the following optimality conditions
cλ
(
λA2 , µ
A
2
)
= rA − i2 (1− t2) , (3.2)
cµ
(
λA2 , µ
A
2
)
= i2 (t2 − t1) . (3.3)
2Note that Equation (3.1) implicitly assumes that the firm is not experiencing losses
and that debt interest expenses are fully deductible.
3On the one hand, these costs may be associated with financial distress (Kraus and
Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976). Agency cost models, on the other hand, introduce costs
which relate to conflicting interests between debt and equity owners (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Myers, 1977).
4cλA1 ≡ ∂c∂λA1 > 0, cλA2 ≡
∂c
∂λA2
> 0, cµA2 ≡ ∂c∂µA2 > 0, cλA1 λA1 ≡
∂2c
∂λA21
> 0, cλA2 λA2 ≡ ∂
2c
∂λA22
>
0, cµA2 µA2 ≡ ∂
2c
∂µA22
> 0.
5cλA2 µA2 ≡ ∂
2c
∂λA2 ∂µ
A
2
> 0.
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The convexity of the cost function implies that λA2 is positive if r
A >
i2 (1− t2).6 While external debt is determined by the local tax rate, the
optimal µA2 is determined by the tax-rate differential between Germany and
the parent country (t2 − t1).
3.3.2 Multinational Firm B
We observe a second multinational with a subsidiary in Germany. Multina-
tional B is identical to firm A, except that the German subsidiary of firm B is
affected by the reform of the thin-capitalization rule. Thus, it is restricted in
the use of internal debt.7 In fact, thin-capitalization rules imply that interest
expenses above a certain threshold of the internal-debt-to-equity ratio are no
longer deductible for tax purposes (see Section 3.2). The profit function for
B can then be written as
piB = f
(
kB1
)
(1− t1) + f
(
kB2
)
(1− t2) (3.4)
− [i1λB1 kB1 ] (1− t1)
− [i2λB2 kB2 ] (1− t2)
+
[
i2µ
B
2 k
B
2
]
(t2 − t1 − φt2)
− [(1− λB1 ) kB1 + (1− λB2 ) kB2 ] rB
− [c (λB1 ) kB1 + c (λB2 , µB2 ) kB2 ] .
6For notational simplicity, cλ and cµ refer to the first derivatives of the cost function
with respect to λA2 and µ
A
2 .
7Note that all notations and assumptions from above apply also for multinational B.
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The share φ of interest expenses associated with internal debt is not de-
ductible and therefore does not add value to the debt tax shield of the multi-
national (see line four).8 Although Equation (3.4) implies that there is a
reduced benefit from using internal debt, interest expenses for external debt
remain fully deductible. The multinational’s first-order conditions are then
given by
cλ
(
λB2 , µ
B
2
)
= rB − i2 (1− t2) , (3.5)
cµ
(
λB2 , µ
B
2
)
= i2 (t2 − t1 − φt2) . (3.6)
Equation (3.6) suggests that the incentive to use internal debt is partially
offset, because the marginal benefit of using internal debt is reduced by the
thin-capitalization rule. As long as the tax-rate difference is sufficiently large,
however, there is an incentive to use internal debt to shift profits.
Recall that the German subsidiaries of the multinationals A and B are iden-
tical, except that the subsidiary of B is affected by the reform of the thin-
capitalization rule. If the subsidiaries choose µ and λ simultaneously, and if
rA is similar to rB, the assumptions about the functional form of c(λ, µ) im-
ply that λA∗2 < λ
B∗
2 , because µ
A∗
2 > µ
B∗
2 . This means that, as a consequence
of a tighter thin-capitalization rule, subsidiary B is inclined to use additional
external debt, whereas subsidiary A is not.
Prediction: A subsidiary that is affected by a tighter thin-capitalization rule
increases external debt usage compared to a non-affected subsidiary.
8The non-deductibility is captured by φ
(
i2µ
B
2 k
B
2 t2
)
, where we assume 0 < φ < 1. The
actual φ depends on the thin-capitalization threshold and on the firm’s internal-debt-to-
equity ratio. The empirical analysis exploits the exogenous variation of the threshold.
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3.4 Empirical Investigation Approach
This section describes the empirical identification strategy. As noted pre-
viously, the basic goal of this study is to investigate how firms respond to
a change in the thin-capitalization threshold with respect to their external
debt usage. Thereby, the analysis also reveals how internal debt generally
relates to external debt.
To address the research issue, we do not use standard regression techniques,
because external and internal debt are determined simultaneously. Hence,
we cannot consider exogenous variation of one variable and simply regress
external on internal debt or vice versa. Since exclusion restrictions are also
difficult to justify, even instrumental variable techniques are not convincing
and may result in biased estimates and misleading inference. We shall choose
a research design that sufficiently takes into account endogeneity issues by
using both a policy reform (the 2001 reform of the thin-capitalization rule)
as a quasi-experimental setting and propensity score matching techniques.
Our data contains information on the capital structure of foreign subsidiaries
in Germany, including information on internal borrowing. We can use this
data in combination with information about the German thin-capitalization
threshold level θ¯ to identify firms for which interest deduction is denied be-
cause the thin-capitalization rule is binding. According to the evaluation
literature we refer to these firms as the treatment group (see, e.g., Blun-
dell and Costa Dias, 2002). The change in the outcome variable due to the
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treatment is called the treatment effect. If subsidiaries are not subject to
treatment, they are assigned to the control group. The treatment status of
firm j is indicated by the binary variable Tj, defined as
Tj = 1 if θj,t < θ¯t−1 and θj,t > θ¯t,
Tj = 0 if θj,t < θ¯t−1 and θj,t < θ¯t.
The year t refers to the reform year 2001. We look at a single firm j that
can be affected by the legal thin-capitalization rule θ¯. θ¯ corresponds to the
allowed internal-debt-to-equity ratio (equity inclusive of internal debt), and
θj,t is the internal-debt-to-equity ratio of the firm.
9 Note that above definition
implies that, although a treated firm would have been below the pre-reform
threshold (θ¯t−1) level in t, it is above the post-reform threshold. Using this
definition, we ensure that a firm is affected by an exogenous reform. We allow
θ¯, the German thin-capitalization rule, to differ according to the legal form
of the firm, because different threshold levels apply (see Section 3.2; note,
though, that we abstract from using an index for the legal form, for the sake
of simplicity). With respect to the theoretical model, Equation (3.4) refers
to cases where T = 1. If θj is sufficiently low, then Equation (3.1) applies
and T = 0.
We define the outcome variable as the change in the share of external debt
∆λ, calculated as λt+1−λt.10 We expect that affected subsidiaries are adjust-
9A thin-capitalization rule of 3:1 translates into an internal-debt-to-equity ratio θ¯ of
0.75. The post-reform ratio of 1.5:1, hence, corresponds to θ¯ = 0.6.
10Since the empirical analysis is concerned with the 2001 reform, ∆λ refers to λ2002 −
λ2001. The intuition for this definition is that the exogenous shock is at the beginning
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ing their capital structure during the period after the shock. In particular,
we expect a positive treatment effect, indicating that treated firms increase
external debt usage compared to non-treated firms.
The optimal setting to investigate the effect of the reform is described by
the counterfactual framework (Heckman, 2005, 2008). A real counterfactual
would require observing each subsidiary in both states (with and without
treatment). Since this is not possible, the aim is to choose the control group
such that control units are as similar as possible to the treatment group.
A perfect control group would only differ in terms of the treatment status.
Whether a company is affected by a stricter thin-capitalization rule, however,
is not random. Since both groups presumably differ also without treatment,
comparing the mean values of the change in external debt between treated
and non-treated firms would bias the results. For instance, financially con-
strained or financially distressed firms may have a higher probability to be
treated, because they potentially depend on internal loans from the parent
company (Gopalan et al., 2007) and may only have limited access to ex-
ternal debt. A strategy for overcoming this problem is to find a group of
non-affected companies that is similar to the treated firms in relevant pre-
treatment characteristics X.
of 2001; from 2001 to 2002, the firms may adjust their capital structure. The share of
external debt λ is defined as external liabilities relative to total capital. The latter consists
of nominal capital, capital reserves, profit reserves, and total debt.
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3.4.1 Propensity Score Matching
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) describe how one can bundle firm char-
acteristics in a single-index variable, the propensity score. On the basis of
this propensity score we can match treated and non-treated firms such that
they are comparable with respect to relevant observable characteristics. One
advantage of this non-parametric approach is that it is a very intuitive way
to estimate treatment effects, because we determine treated firms by a set of
observable variables, and then compare firms to appropriate matches (firms
which are not affected, but similar in other respects). Formally, the propen-
sity score can be described as the probability of receiving a treatment given
pre-treatment characteristics
p(X) ≡ Pr{T = 1|X} = E{T |X}.
T = {0, 1} is the treatment variable as defined above and X is the multidi-
mensional vector of pre-treatment characteristics. If the exposure to treat-
ment is random within cells defined by X, it is also random within cells
defined by the values of the mono-dimensional variable p(X). Then, the
Average effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT) can be estimated as
ATT ≡ E{∆λ1j −∆λ0j|Tj = 1}
= E{E{∆λ1j −∆λ0j|Tj = 1, p(Xj)}}
= E{E{∆λ1j|Tj = 1, p(Xj)} − E{∆λ0j|Tj = 0, p(Xj)}|Tj = 1},
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where the variable ∆λ0j denotes the counterfactual outcome. Note that
the real counterfactual outcome for treated firms is not observed; we do
not know how the firms would have chosen their financial structure without
treatment. Yet we can use the control group as a substitute and condition on
the propensity score. However, we need two additional assumptions to obtain
the result for the ATT. First, pre-treatment variables of the two groups have
the same distribution given the propensity score (balancing property). If this
assumption holds, the treatment is considered to be random. The second
assumption is called the unconfoundedness assumption. It requires that,
given the propensity score, potential outcomes are independent of treatment
assignment (see the Appendix, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, for more details on
the assumptions).
Estimating the ATT using propensity score matching involves a two-step
procedure, where we predict the probability of being affected by the 2001
reform of the thin-capitalization rule in a first step (using a probit or logit
regression). The binary dependent variable corresponds to Tj as defined
above. In a second step, we match treated and control units and estimate
the treatment effect. If we were observing exactly the same propensity score
for two firms, we could simply compare these two observations. However,
the propensity score is a continuous variable and the probability of observing
the same value for two firms is infinitely small. For this reason, we do need
methods to match comparable firms.
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3.4.2 Matching Methods
We make use of four different matching methods: nearest neighbor match-
ing, radius matching, stratification matching, and kernel matching.11 Nearest
neighbor matching matches to each treated company the control unit with
the closest propensity score. Untreated firms can be used more than once
as a match. Subsequently, the difference in the outcome variable between
matched units is computed to obtain the ATT. Note that one match is as-
signed to every treated firm, no matter how close propensity scores actually
are. This can result in a rather unsatisfying matching quality. We can over-
come this problem, to some extent, when we use radius matching. This
method matches treatment units with control units only if the propensity
score falls into a certain range. The smaller we define the radius – the tolera-
ble distance within which units are matched – the better is the quality of the
matches. The stratification method splits the sample according to the value
of the propensity score into intervals. Within each interval, treated and con-
trol units have on average the same propensity score. We obtain the ATT by
calculating the difference between average outcomes of the treated and the
controls within each interval. However, we possibly lose observations if we
do not find comparable firms within one interval. Kernel matching, finally,
does not only use some of the control observations. Rather, this matching es-
timator constructs the counterfactual outcome by using weighted averages of
all controls. The weights proportionally decrease with an increasing distance
between the propensity scores of treated firms and controls.
11For more details about matching algorithms, consult, for example, Morgan and Hard-
ing (2006), Dehejia and Wahba (2002).
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To evaluate different matching methods, we need to take into account the
trade-off between quantity and quality of matches. Whereas more informa-
tion can improve the efficiency of the estimates, a higher matching quality can
reduce the bias. Radius matching, for example, rather avoids bad matches
compared to nearest neighbor matching.
3.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical investigation relies on the MiDi (Microdatabase Direct In-
vestment) database collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Two aspects of
MiDi are particularly noteworthy: first, according to the German Trade and
Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz) in connection with the Foreign Trade
and Payments Regulation (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung), a German affiliate
held by a foreign investor is obliged to provide balance-sheet information.
Hence, above a minimum reporting threshold, we observe all foreign affili-
ates in Germany. Second,MiDi does not only provide information about the
affiliates’ total debt, it also includes information about internal borrowing.
The corresponding question in the FDI stock survey asks the participants
to report liabilities to affiliated enterprises linked with the party required to
report through participating interests (Lipponer, 2007).
Table 3.1 provides a list of the investor countries, including means of affiliate
characteristics as well as the total number of subsidiaries in a country. All
statistics refer to the year 2001. Due to data protection, we only report
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countries with at least 5 investments. To avoid any conflicting participation
interests (e.g., Desai et al., 2004b), we exclude all minority holdings. The
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States are the most important
investor countries. However, the country of the foreign investor may not
always be the ultimate parent country. This explains the large number of
observations from the Netherlands and also from Switzerland, because both
countries are frequently used to establish intermediate holding companies
(see Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008).
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics. The treatment variable T , which is
analyzed in a first-step binary model (see Section 3.6 and the Appendix
for further details), indicates that approx. 15% of all subsidiaries in the
estimation sample are affected by the reform of the thin-capitalization rule.
T is determined by several explanatory variables: first of all, we expect
that tax-rate differentials have a positive impact on the propensity to be
treated.12 Moreover, we expect that the subsidiary’s sales positively relate to
the probability of being treated, because sales capture the size of a firm (e.g.,
Graham and Harvey, 2001). Another helpful variable to predict treatment is
the binary variable loss carry-forward. The variable is one if the firm carries
forward any losses, and zero otherwise. If firms are in a loss situation, the
incentive to engage in tax planning is reduced (see MacKie-Mason, 1990).
Therefore, we expect firms with losses to be less frequently treated by the
reform of the thin-capitalization rule. Finally, we control for the tangible-to-
total assets ratio of firms (tangibility). Higher tangibility may be associated
12Equation (3.3) motivates the inclusion of the tax-rate differential (t2 − t1).
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with better access to external credits, because tangible assets can be used as
collateral. Since a high level of external liabilities implies that the probability
to be treated is low, we may expect a negative coefficient for tangibility.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Error Min. Max.
Tax-Rate Differential (t2 − t1) .050 .057 -.029 .392
ln(Sales) 10.33 1.42 c) c)
Loss carry-forward .333 .471 0 1
Tangibility .363 2.16 c) c)
Treatment (T ) .151 .358 0 1
Share of Internal Debt .240 .228 c) c)
Share of External Debt .362 .277 c) c)
Source: MiDi. 3,309 observations. c) confidential information. Treatment (T ) defined as described in
Section 3.4. Tax-rate differential defined as (tGermany − tForeign). For further variable definitions, see
the Appendix.
3.6 Results
We use a binary choice model to obtain the propensity score. Correspond-
ing first-step estimation results and also tests for the balancing property are
reported in the Appendix (Tables 3.6 and 3.7). Concerning the inclusion of
control variables in the binary model, we closely follow the existing litera-
ture on the capital structure choice of multinational enterprises (see, e.g.,
Overesch and Wamser, 2008). Note that we implicitly control for macroeco-
nomic factors in Germany, because all foreign investors are exposed to the
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same economic situation in the destination country. According to the re-
sults of the binary-choice models, a higher tax-rate differential is associated
with a higher propensity to be treated, because the incentive for the German
subsidiary to use internal debt finance is higher if the tax-rate difference is
higher. Note that the variation in the foreign statutory tax rate is crucial to
identifying an effect of the tax-rate differential. While the coefficient shows
the expected sign, the effect is not statistically significant. The subsidiaries’
sales relate positively to the propensity to be above the threshold level. The
existence of a loss carry-forward reduces the incentives for tax-planning ac-
tivities, and therefore reduces the probability of a treatment. We do not find
a significant impact of the tangibility variable.
3.6.1 Results for External Debt
Table 3.3 presents the results for the change in the external-debt-to-capital
ratio. Since different matching algorithms imply a trade-off between bias and
efficiency, we report the results for the different procedures. As expected,
standard errors are higher in the case of the nearest neighbor matching.
However, the findings are robust and treatment is significantly related to the
change in the share of external debt in all specifications. The findings confirm
theoretical expectations: there is evidence for a positive average treatment
effect on the treated. Estimates are in the range of .023 to .027, depending on
the matching method. A coefficient of .027 implies that a treated subsidiary
increases its external-debt-to-capital ratio by 2.7 percentage points.
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Table 3.3: Propensity Score Matching, Share of External Debt
Outcome Variable: Change in the Share of External Debt
Nearest Neighbor Matching
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) .027 (.010)∗∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.011)∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 438
Radius Matching (radius=.1)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) .023 (.006)∗∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.006)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,725
Radius Matching (radius=.001)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) .023 (.006)∗∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.007)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 489
Number of Control Firms: 2,648
Stratification Matching
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.)
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) .026 (.006)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,725
Kernel Matching (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.06)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.)
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) .024 (.005)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,809
Coefficient (Std. Dev.). Propensity score based on probit estimation (see Appendix, Table 3.6). Calcu-
lations are based on the statistical software provided by Becker and Ichino (2002). Standard errors (in
parentheses). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. Outcome variable: change
in the share of external debt, defined as λt+1 − λt, where λ is defined as external liabilities relative to
total capital. The latter consists of nominal capital, capital reserves, profit reserves, and total debt.
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Table 3.4: Propensity Score Matching, Level of External Debt
Outcome Variable: Change in the Level of External Debt
Nearest Neighbor Matching
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) .084 (.050)∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.062)
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 438
Radius Matching (radius=.1)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) .074 (.033)∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.031)∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,725
Radius Matching (radius=.001)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) .078 (.035)∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.036)∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 489
Number of Control Firms: 2,648
Stratification Matching
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.)
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) .078 (.037)∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,725
Kernel Matching (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.06)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.)
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) .076 (.029)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,809
Coefficient (Std. Dev.). Propensity score based on probit estimation (see Appendix, Table 3.6). Calcu-
lations are based on the statistical software provided by Becker and Ichino (2002). Standard errors (in
parentheses). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. Outcome variable: change
in the level of external debt, defined as the change in the natural logarithm of the liabilities to external
creditors, ln(external liabilitiest+1) - ln(external liabilitiest).
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Table 3.5: Propensity Score Matching, Share of Internal Debt
Outcome Variable: Change in the Share of Internal Debt
Nearest Neighbor Matching
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) -.050 (.011)∗∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.011)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 438
Radius Matching (radius=.1)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) -.043 (.008)∗∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.009)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,725
Radius Matching (radius=.001)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.) -.042 (.008)∗∗∗
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) (.008)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 489
Number of Control Firms: 2,648
Stratification Matching
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.)
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) -.045 (.008)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,725
Kernel Matching (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.06)
Average Effect of Treatment (Std. Err.)
(Bootstrapped Standard Errors) -.043 (.007)∗∗∗
Number of Treated Firms: 500
Number of Control Firms: 2,809
Coefficient (Std. Dev.). Propensity score based on probit estimation (see Appendix, Table 3.6). Calcu-
lations are based on the statistical software provided by Becker and Ichino (2002). Standard errors (in
parentheses). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. Outcome variable: change
in the share of internal debt, defined as µt+1−µt, where µ is defined as internal liabilities relative to total
capital. The latter consists of nominal capital, capital reserves, profit reserves, and total debt.
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Findings in Table 3.3 confirm that firms substitute external for internal debt
if we consider the debt-to-capital ratios. The analysis presented in Table 3.4
investigates whether the positive treatment effect is still identified if we define
the outcome variable as the level of external debt. To be specific, the outcome
variable is calculated as the change in the natural logarithm of the liabilities
to external creditors (ln(external liabilitiest+1) - ln(external liabilitiest)). The
results show that treatment by the 2001 reform of the thin-capitalization rule
is related to more external debt. Except for the nearest neighbor matching
with bootstrapped standard errors, the coefficient is always significant. The
ATT of .078 implies that an affected subsidiary expands its external liabilities
by approx. 8%.
3.6.2 Results for Internal Debt
In addition to the analysis concerning the share of external debt, we examine
the effectiveness of the thin-capitalization reform with respect to internal
debt. Table 3.5 contains results where the outcome variable is defined as
the change in the share of internal debt.13 If firms are affected by the thin-
capitalization reform, we expect a negative treatment effect. In other words,
treated affiliates reduce their internal-debt-to-capital ratios, because interest
deduction is no longer possible. A coefficient of -.05 implies that treatment
by the reform of the thin-capitalization rule is associated with a 5 percentage
point lower internal-debt-to-capital ratio. If we consider both the treatment
13The analysis confirms empirical findings of earlier research (see Buettner et al., 2008;
Overesch and Wamser, 2008; Weichenrieder and Windischbauer, 2008).
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effect for the change in the share of internal debt and the change in the share
of external debt, we find that the affected firm can substitute external debt
for approx. 55% of the reduction in its internal-debt-to-capital ratio (using
the averages of the estimated ATTs in Tables 3.3 and 3.5 for this evaluation).
3.7 Conclusion
The empirical literature on corporate taxation and multinational compa-
nies provides extensive evidence that multinationals are mobile in various
aspects and can avoid taxes (see, e.g., Devereux and Maffini, 2007). Policy-
makers who value adequate tax revenue, therefore, feel inclined to restrict
tax-planning opportunities. In recent decades, for instance, various forms
of debt-equity restrictions have been imposed in several countries. Germany
and many other countries apply so-called thin-capitalization rules which limit
the amount of deductible interest payments to affiliated companies.
This paper has exploited a reform of the German thin-capitalization rule in
order to examine how subsidiaries of multinational firms adjust their capital
structure after being affected by a stricter rule. The findings suggest that
firms, to some extent, are able to substitute external for internal debt. In
particular, a treated subsidiary increases its external-debt-to-capital ratio
by approx. 2.5 percentage points relative to the counterfactual outcome. In
terms of the stock of external borrowing, treatment is associated with approx.
8% more external debt.
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Governments presumably pursue a twofold aim when introducing thin-capita-
lization rules: to defend the domestic corporate tax base and to reduce dis-
crimination against purely domestic companies (because domestic firms are
not able to shift profits).14 Concerning the first goal, the results imply that
thin-capitalization restrictions aimed at avoiding adverse consequences for
corporate tax revenue are not necessarily rewarding. With respect to the
second goal, thin-capitalization rules may be considered as being appropri-
ate, because excessive thin capitalization no longer provides an opportunity
to shift profits. Yet, though both domestic and multinational firms are unre-
stricted in the use of external debt, multinational firms may also have better
access to external debt finance (and interest payments to external lenders
are usually deductible).
In 2004, Germany responded to the Lankhorst-Hohorst judgment of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice by extending the scope of application of its thin-
capitalization rule to loans from resident companies (see Ko¨rner, 2004). More
recently, the 2008 corporate tax reform replaced the thin-capitalization rule
by a so-called earnings-stripping rule.15 In view of the findings of this in-
vestigation, this recent reform of the rule seems to be sensible. And yet, to
evaluate the medium- and long-term impact on the economy, policymakers
should consider the effect of the new earnings-stripping rule on firms’ cost
14By contrast, some countries may strategically remove thin-capitalization restrictions
to attract FDI (see Haufler and Runkel, 2008).
15Under the new interest barrier (Zinsschranke), interest deductions are limited to 30%
of earnings (EBITDA). The new interest barrier rule includes several exceptions and ad-
ditional requirements (escape clause, single business exception, exemption limit; see, e.g.,
Mu¨ller-Duttine´ and Scheunemann, 2007).
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of capital and therefore on real investment: a general non-deductibility of
interest expenses is comparable to an additional tax that would risk driving
productive capital, rather than tax bases, out of high-tax countries.
The central insight of this analysis is that any policy that urges multinationals
to report income locally rather than shifting it to low-tax countries requires
careful consideration. As to future research, additional work is needed to un-
derstand the role of internal debt which is not related to profit shifting. This
is probably a significant share and must not be affected by thin-capitalization
rules. Moreover, to develop a deeper understanding of substitution possibil-
ities in a dynamic context, future research should aim at testing how costly
it is for companies to adjust their capital structure.
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Appendix
The estimation of the average treatment effect relies on two assumptions.
First, the balancing property has to hold. This assumption is testable. Re-
sults are displayed in Table 3.7. Second, unconfoundedness given the pre-
treatment characteristics X and given the propensity score p(X) has to be
satisfied. The unconfoundedness assumption refers to the assignment to the
treatment. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) formulate Lemma 1 and Lemma
2, where p(X) is the propensity score, T the treatment and X is the vector
of pre-treatment characteristics:
Lemma 1 (Balancing Property): T ⊥ X | p (X).
Lemma 2 (Unconfoundedness): Y1, Y0 ⊥ T | X,
Y1, Y0 ⊥ T | p (X).
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Table 3.6: Probability of Treatment
Probit Logit
Tax-Rate Difference .016 (.584) .048 (1.02)
ln(Sales) .040 (.020)∗∗ .074 (.036)∗∗
Loss carry-forward -.163 (.059)∗∗∗ -.302 (.110)∗∗∗
Tangibility -.029 (.044) -.063 (.094)
Sector 2 -.521 (.417) -.907 (.779)
Sector 3 -.082 (.228) -.145 (.388)
Sector 4 -.376 (.156)∗∗ -.677 (.265)∗∗
Sector 5 -.502 (.217)∗∗ -.927 (.393)∗∗
Sector 6 -.598 (.267)∗∗ -1.11 (.503)∗∗
Sector 7 -.171 (.157) -.308 (.267)
Sector 8 -.359 (.327) -.647 (.598)
Sector 9 -.637 (.208)∗∗∗ -1.17 (.386)∗∗∗
Sector 10 -.572 (.192)∗∗∗ -1.05 (.346)∗∗∗
Sector 11 -.699 (.274)∗∗ -1.28 (.531)∗∗
Sector 12 -.789 (.516) -1.45 (1.06)
Europe -.553 (.262)∗∗ -.962 (.426)∗∗
America -.679 (.275)∗∗ -1.19 (.453)∗∗∗
Asia -.452 (.283) -.766 (.466)∗
Observations 3,309 3,309
Log-likelihood -1,372.92 -1,372.71
Pseudo R-sq .023 .023
Source: MiDi. Considered are only majority-owned affiliates. Robust standard errors (in parentheses).
(***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. Sector dummies are defined according
to Table 3.8. Dependent variable: Treatment (T ). Regarding the regional dummies, ‘Rest of the World’
is the reference group.
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Table 3.7: Balancing Property
Mean Mean Bias Bias reduc-
Variable (Treated) (Control) in % tion in % t-value p-value
Tax-Rate Diff. .052 .050 2.9 9.1 .46 .645
ln(Sales) 10.519 10.597 -5.6 65.0 -.92 .359
Loss carry-f. .28 .288 -1.7 87.1 -.28 .779
Tangibility .292 .289 .1 97.0 .14 .888
Sector 2 .004 .012 -11.7 -497.0 -1.42 .156
Sector 3 .03 .032 -1.3 83.1 -.18 .855
Sector 4 .42 .402 3.6 47.5 .58 .563
Sector 5 .026 .018 4.6 19.6 .86 .389
Sector 6 .012 .016 -3.2 51.8 -.54 .591
Sector 7 .378 .374 .9 95.9 .13 .896
Sector 8 .008 .012 -4.3 -218.5 -.64 .525
Sector 9 .028 .034 -2.9 81.1 -.55 .585
Sector 10 .042 .052 -4.4 59.9 -.75 .456
Sector 11 .01 .008 1.6 82.9 .33 .738
Sector 12 .002 0 3.4 33.0 1.00 .318
Europe .778 .776 .5 46.0 .08 .940
America .13 .134 -1.1 88.7 -.19 .852
Asia .076 .07 2.4 72.1 .36 .716
Source: MiDi. 3,309 observations, 500 treated observations, 2,809 untreated observations. The balancing
property is tested by using the software pstest provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
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Table 3.8: Variable Definitions
Internal-debt ratio (µ) Definition: Liabilities to shareholders/affiliated enter-
prises linked with the party required to report
through participating interests divided by to-
tal capital consisting of nominal capital, cap-
ital reserves, profit reserves, and total debt.
Source: MiDi
External-debt ratio (λ) Definition: Borrowing from external creditors divided by
total capital consisting of nominal capital,
capital reserves, profit reserves, and total
debt.
Source: MiDi
Sales Definition: Affiliate-specific sales.
Source: MiDi
Loss carry-forward Definition: Binary variable. If a firm carries forward any
losses, the dummy variable is 1.
Source: MiDi
Tangibility Definition: Ratio of fixed assets to balance-sheet total.
Source: MiDi
Tax-Rate Differential Definition: Difference in statutory tax rates between
Germany and investors’ home countries
(tGermany − tForeign).
Source: Statutory tax rates are taken from the In-
ternational Bureau of Fiscal Documenta-
tion (IBFD) and from tax surveys provided
by Ernst&Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC), and KPMG. Tax rates take into ac-
count restrictions on interest deductibility.
Sector Definition Sectors are defined according to the following
classification: Agriculture (Sector 1); Mining
(Sector 2); Metal Working Industry (Sector 3);
Manufacturing (Sector 4); Electricity and Wa-
ter Supply, Sewage Disposal, Telecommunica-
tion, Transport and Post (Sector 5); Construc-
tion (Sector 6); Retail and Wholesale Trade
(Sector 7); Hotels and Restaurants (Sector
8); Other Services (Sector 9); Financial Inter-
mediation and Financial Services (Sector 10);
Computer, Research and Development (Sector
11); Government, Social Security, Social Care,
Private Households, and Nonprofit Organiza-
tions (Sector 12).
Chapter 3 – The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt 100
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the Deutsche Bundesbank for granting access to the FDI
database. I thank Chang Woon Nam and Fe´de´ric Holm-Hadulla for helpful
comments and discussions. I am indebted to Sascha Becker and Andrea
Ichino for providing the statistical software for the propensity score matching.
Literature
Auerbach, A.J. (2002). Taxation and corporate financial policy. In: A.
Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol.
3. Amsterdam, 1251-1292.
Becker, S.O. and A. Ichino (2002). Estimation of average treatment effects
based on propensity scores, The Stata Journal 2, 358-377.
Blundell, R. and M. Costa Dias (2002). Alternative approaches to eval-
uation in empirical microeconomics, Portuguese Economic Journal 1,
91-115.
Buettner, T. and G. Wamser (2007). Intercompany loans and profit shifting
– evidence from company-level data, CESifo Working Paper No. 1959,
Munich.
Chapter 3 – The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt 101
Buettner, T., M. Overesch, U. Schreiber, and G. Wamser (2008). The
impact of thin-capitalization rules on multinationals’ financing and in-
vestment decisions, Bundesbank Discussion Paper, 03/2008, Frankfurt.
Dehejia, R.H. and S. Wahba (2002). Propensity score-matching methods
for nonexperimental causal studies, The Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics 84, 151-161.
Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley, and J.R. Hines (2004a). A multinational per-
spective on capital structure choice and internal capital markets, The
Journal of Finance 59, 2451-2487.
Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley, and J.R. Hines (2004b). The costs of shared own-
ership: evidence from international joint ventures, Journal of Financial
Economics 73, 323-374.
Devereux, M.P. and G. Maffini (2007). The impact of taxation on the
location of capital, firms and profit: a survey of empirical evidence,
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series,
WP 07/02.
Dourado, A.P. and R. de la Feria (2008). Thin capitalization rules in the
context of the CCCTB, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper Series, WP 08/04.
Chapter 3 – The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt 102
Fama, E.F. (1978). The effects of a firm’s financing and investment decisions
on the welfare of its security holders, American Economic Review 68,
272-284.
Gopalan, R., V. Nanda, and A. Seru (2007). Affiliated firms and financial
support: evidence from Indian business groups, Journal of Financial
Economics 86, 759-795.
Graham, J.R. (2000). How big are the tax benefits of debt? The Journal
of Finance 55, 1901-1941.
Graham, J.R. (2003). Taxes and corporate finance: a review, The Review
of Financial Studies 16, 1075-1129.
Graham, J.R. and C.R. Harvey (2001). The theory and practice of corporate
finance: evidence from the field, Journal of Financial Economics 60,
187-243.
Haufler, A. and M. Runkel (2008). Multinationals’ capital structures, thin
capitalization rules, and corporate tax competition. Paper presented
at the 2008 meeting of the European Tax Policy Forum, London.
Heckman, J.J. (2005). The scientific model of causality, Sociological Method-
ology 35, 1-97.
Chapter 3 – The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt 103
Heckman, J.J. (2008). Econometric causality, International Statistical Re-
view 76, 1-27.
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial be-
havior, agency costs, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial
Economics 7, 305-360.
Kemsley, D. and D. Nissim (2002). Valuation of the debt tax shield, The
Journal of Finance 57, 2045-2073.
Ko¨rner, A. (2004). The new German thin capitalization rules: tax planning;
incompatibility with European law, Intertax 32(8/9), 401-415.
Kraus, A. and R.H. Litzenberger (1973). A state-preference model of opti-
mal financial leverage, Journal of Finance 28, 911-922.
Leuven, E. and B. Sianesi (2003). PSMATCH2: Stata module to per-
form full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support
graphing, and covariate imbalance testing, version 3.0.0.,
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html.
Lipponer, A. (2007). Microdatabase Direct Investment – MiDi. A brief
guide, Bundesbank Discussion Paper, Frankfurt.
MacKie-Mason, J. (1990). Do taxes affect corporate financing decisions?
The Journal of Finance 45, 1471-1493.
Chapter 3 – The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt 104
Mintz, J. and A.J. Weichenrieder (2005). Taxation and the financial struc-
ture of German outbound FDI, CESifo Working Paper No. 1612,
Munich.
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958). The cost of capital, corporation fi-
nance, and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48,
261-297.
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost
of capital: a correction, American Economic Review 53, 443-453.
Morgan, S.L. and D.J. Harding (2006). Matching estimators of causal ef-
fects: prospects and pitfalls in theory and practice, Sociological Methods
& Research 35, 3-60.
Mu¨ller-Duttine´, T. and M.P. Scheunemann (2007). New German tax rules
on financing expenses, Intertax 35, 518-525.
Myers S.C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 3, 799-819.
Myers, S.C. (2001). Capital structure, Journal of Economic Perspectives
15, 81-102.
Overesch, M. and G. Wamser (2008). Corporate tax planning and thin-
capitalization rules: evidence from a quasi-experiment, forthcoming in
Applied Economics.
Chapter 3 – The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt 105
Ramb, F. and A.J. Weichenrieder (2005). Taxes and the financial structure
of German inward FDI, Review of World Economics 141, 670-692.
Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin (1983). The central role of the propensity
score in observational studies for causal effects, Biometrika 70, 41-55.
Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin (1984). Reducing bias in observational
studies using subclassification on the propensity score, Journal of the
American Statistical Association 79, 516-524.
Ruf, M. (2008). Using mergers and acquisitions for implementing tax in-
duced debt finance, Working Paper, University of Mannheim.
Scott, J.H. (1976). A theory of optimal capital structure, Bell Journal of
Economics 7, 33-54.
Weichenrieder, A.J. and J. Mintz (2008). What determines the use of hold-
ing companies and ownership chains? Oxford University Centre for
Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 08/03.
Weichenrieder, A.J. and H. Windischbauer (2008). Thin-capitalization rules
and company responses – experience from German legislation, mimeo,
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt.
Chapter 4
Internal Debt and
Multinationals’ Tax Planning:
Empirical Evidence from Panel
Data
Chapter 4 – Internal Debt and Multinationals’ Tax Planning 107
Abstract∗
This paper investigates the determinants of internal debt issued by for-
eign affiliates of multinational corporations. A theoretical analysis discusses
the choice of the capital structure in a setting where internal debt can be
used to shift taxable profits to low-tax countries and derives testable predic-
tions. Empirical evidence on the tax sensitivity of internal debt is provided
using micro-level panel data of virtually all German multinationals made
available by the German Central Bank (Bundesbank). This comprehensive
dataset allows us to exploit differences in taxing conditions of 175 countries
over a period of ten years. The empirical results confirm a robust impact
of tax-rate differences within the multinational group on the use of internal
debt, supporting the profit-shifting hypothesis. However, the tax effects are
rather small, suggesting that costs related to adjusting the capital structure
are substantial.
4.1 Introduction
Due to the rising importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the
emergence of multinational firms, international tax issues are of increasing
importance for corporate financing decisions. As is well noted in the liter-
ature (e.g., Gresik, 2001), a multinational corporation has several ways to
structure its activities in order to minimize the burden of taxation. This
tax planning also involves the capital structure since multinationals can use
external as well as internal funds to adjust their capital structure. In par-
ticular, multinationals can exploit opportunities for tax planning by means
∗This chapter is joint work with Thiess Bu¨ttner. It is based on our paper “Intercompany
Loans and Profit Shifting – Evidence from Company-Level Data”. An earlier version is
available as CESifo Working Paper No. 1959.
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of internal debt. Borrowing from affiliates located in low-tax countries and
lending to affiliates at high-tax locations will allow the latter to deduct inter-
est payments and shift taxable profits into the low-tax countries. Yet there
are more strategies to shift taxable profits to low-tax countries, for instance,
by means of transfer pricing (e.g., Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; Swenson,
2001; Clausing, 2003).
While several papers document that tax-planning activities have significant
effects on the distribution of taxable profits of multinationals (e.g., Grubert
and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008), so
far, the empirical literature has not provided evidence about the extent to
which internal debt is involved. Some papers show that the capital structure
of multinationals’ affiliates is sensitive to the tax rate in the host country
(e.g., Jog and Tang, 2001; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004a; Mintz and We-
ichenrieder, 2005; Buettner et al., 2006). But similar results have also been
obtained for domestic corporations (e.g., Gordon and Lee, 2001). Moreover,
as noted by Graham (2003) and Mintz and Smart (2004), tax planning by
means of internal debt should respond not only to the local tax rate but
also to the tax-rate difference between the lending and the borrowing affil-
iate within the multinational group. This view is supported by Huizinga,
Laeven, and Nicode`me (2008), who show that the debt-to-asset ratio of Eu-
ropean multinationals is significantly affected by the host country tax rate
as well as by the tax-rate differences relative to other affiliates in the group.
However, quantitatively, their results point at rather small effects.
Against this background, the contribution of this paper is to provide direct
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evidence on whether and to what extent internal debt is used for tax-planning
purposes. The paper employs a large micro-level panel database of virtually
all German multinationals made available for research by the German Central
Bank (Bundesbank). This unique dataset allows us to consider the capital
structure and, in particular, the determinants of internal debt of German
multinationals in 175 countries over a period of 10 years.
The empirical results strongly support a significant impact of the tax-rate
difference on internal debt, suggesting that internal debt is indeed used to
shift profits from high- to low-tax countries. The host country tax, however,
is insignificant suggesting that internal debt is not used to minimize the cost
of capital. These results prove robust if we take account of the potential
effects of Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules. However, even if we
focus on majority-owned subsidiaries, the implied tax effects are rather small.
This finding is indicative of substantial costs of adjusting the capital structure
for tax-planning purposes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we model a corporation
which is active at different locations, including low-tax countries. The cor-
poration is assumed to maximize profits by optimally using debt, exploiting
also differences in international taxation. From the optimality conditions we
obtain testable empirical implications, which are discussed in Section 4.3.
Section 4.4 gives a short description of the dataset and discusses the investi-
gation approach. Section 4.5 provides descriptive statistics. The basic results
are presented in Section 4.6. In Subsection 4.6.1 our analysis additionally
takes account of the German Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules.
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Some further evidence showing how the results change when only majority-
owned subsidiaries are considered is presented in Subsection 4.6.2. Section
4.7 provides the conclusions.
4.2 Theoretical Considerations
Consider a multinational group with affiliates in N countries. For simplicity,
let us assume that each country hosts just one affiliate such that the tax
system varies between affiliates. The profit function of the group is given by
pi =
N∑
i=1
f (ki) (1− τi)
−
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
[ijλjiki] (1− τi)
−
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1,i6=j
[ijµjiki] (1− τi) +
N∑
j=1,i 6=j
N∑
i=1
[ijµjiki] (1− τj)
− r
N∑
i=1
(
1−
∑
j
λji
)
ki
−
N∑
i=1
ci (λ1i, ..., λji, ..., λN,i, µ1i, ..., µji, ..., µNi) ki, with µii = 0.
Let us briefly discuss the components of this profit function. The first line
captures the contribution of output, f(ki), taking account of the fact that
a part of the corresponding profit is taxed away. The host country statu-
tory tax rate is denoted with τi. The second line shows the interest costs
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for external debt which, similarly, enter profits only after tax deduction. ij
is the corresponding lending rate at location j. Note that this term cap-
tures also the interest costs related to internal debt if the corporation issues
some external debt in country j in order to finance the loan to an affiliate
in country i. The third line is also concerned with internal debt but reports
the contribution of pure profit shifting where a loan is given to the affiliate
without increasing external debt.1 The fourth line reports the cost of capital
financed with equity where r is the company-specific rate of return on equity.
The fifth line, finally, captures cost of borrowing in addition to the market
lending rate such as agency cost, for instance.2 The additional cost of bor-
rowing is assumed to increase with the various types of debt in the model.3
Note that we assume that the additional cost of borrowing of affiliate i is
increasing not only in the share of capital financed with external debt λji.
In fact, similar to Mintz and Smart (2004) where internal borrowing involves
1Note that the interest rate for the internal loan is set equal to the external lending
rate. This amounts to the assumption that the arm’s length principle applies to the
remuneration of internal loans.
2The corporate finance literature (see Tirole, 2006, for an overview) justifies the exis-
tence of those additional cost of debt on several grounds. A first set of arguments refers to
the possible cost of financial distress including bankruptcy (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973;
Scott, 1976) as well as agency costs related to the conflict between debtors and creditors
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Another strand of the literature (e.g., Aghion
and Bolton, 1989; Hart, 1988), emphasizes the role of agency costs between shareholders
and management. From this perspective, some debt might be useful to ensure control
rights of investors in bad states, for instance, if a firm goes bankrupt. But, since eq-
uity allows the manager to control the corporation in good states, a tax-induced increase
in the debt-to-asset ratio relative to the optimal level would imply an inefficiency which
contributes to the additional cost of borrowing.
3The additional cost of borrowing function is assumed to be convex. More specifically,
we assume: ∂ci∂λji > 0,
∂ci
∂µji
> 0, ∂
2ci
∂λ2ji
> 0, ∂
2ci
∂µ2ji
> 0.
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deadweight costs, we assume that the additional cost of borrowing will also
increase in the share of internal debt µji as this also implies a decline in the
equity share of the affiliate, ceteris paribus. The first-order conditions are
∂pi
∂λji
= −ij (1− τi) ki + rki − ∂ci
∂λji
ki
!
= 0
∂pi
∂µji
= −ij (1− τi) ki + ij (1− τj) ki − ∂ci
∂µji
ki
!
= 0.
The first of these conditions implies that a loan from affiliate j to affiliate i
– financed with an external credit raised in country j – is a function of the
corresponding after-tax rate of interest
λji = gi ( r − ij (1− τi) , ... ) ,where (4.1)
∂gi
∂ij (1− τi) < 0 for r > ij (1− τi) .
According to the second condition, a loan from affiliate j to affiliate i –
without an increase of external debt – depends on the tax-rate difference
µji = hi ( ij (τi − τj) , ... ) ,where (4.2)
∂hi
∂ij (τi − τj) > 0 for τi > τj.
By imposing somewhat more structure onto the analysis, we can generate
more specific predictions. Consider a simplified cost function where we dis-
tinguish three different kinds of debt
ci = ci
(
λii,
∑
j 6=i
λji,
∑
j 6=i
µji
)
. (4.3)
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λii refers to external debt issued by the affiliate and
∑
j 6=i λji refers to the
amount of internal debt refinanced with external debt issued by the lending
part of the multinational.
∑
j 6=i µji is the amount of internal debt used simply
to shift taxable profits.
With this cost function, if lending rates differ,
∑
j 6=i λji is determined by the
local tax rate and the lowest lending rate among all locations
λji > 0, where j = argmin
k
ik, and zero otherwise. (4.4)
With this condition, λji follows from Equation (4.1).
In contrast,
∑
j 6=i µji is determined by the largest tax-rate difference evalu-
ated with the lending rate
µji > 0, where j = argmax
k
ik (τi − τk) , and zero otherwise. (4.5)
With this condition, the optimal level of µji is determined by Equation (4.2).
4.3 Empirical Implications
The analysis below aims at testing the empirical implications of the model.
Basically, our analysis is concerned with the implications of the first-order
conditions and considers the empirical determinants of internal debt. Let us
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decompose the debt-to-asset ratio Di of each affiliate i into three components
Di ≡ λii +
∑
j 6=i
λji +
∑
j 6=i
µji︸ ︷︷ ︸
IDi
, (4.6)
where the first component is the amount of debt directly raised from external
creditors, the second and third components together make up the amount of
internal debt (IDi). Note that our theoretical model – in contrast to most
of the existing literature – makes a distinction between internal debt, which
is used to minimize cost of capital across capital markets (λji), and internal
debt (µji) which is only used to shift taxable profits. Yet this distinction is
generally not observed empirically. Instead, balance-sheet data, like those
used in the current study, usually provide figures for Di and IDi. However,
since the determinants for λji and µji differ, whether internal debt is driven
by the shifting of taxable profits or by the minimization of the cost of capital
becomes an empirical question that can be answered by an analysis of the
predictive power of the respective determinants.
Abstracting from possible differences in the lending rate, the share of capital
of an affiliate i held by corporation k financed with internal debt IDi,k should
be a function of the local tax rate τi and the maximal tax-rate difference
(τi−τmink ) with regard to all other affiliates in the multinational group (τmink is
the lowest host country tax rate among all affiliates of the group as implied by
Equation (4.5)). In other words, the theory suggests not only to take account
of the local tax rate faced by an affiliate in order to capture the standard tax
shelter of debt finance. Instead, we should also take account of the tax-rate
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difference to the lowest tax rate among all affiliates of a multinational group
as this determines the potential tax savings from profit shifting.4
4.4 Data and Investigation Approach
A basic problem in the empirical analysis of the tax effects on the capi-
tal structure is to find a setting with sufficient empirical variation in the
incentives generated by the tax system. In the current study we utilize a
micro-level panel dataset of German multinationals that offers substantial
variation in three dimensions:
1. A first dimension relates to the international perspective, as the dataset
reports the capital structure of each of the foreign affiliates of a multina-
tional that operates in various countries. While the database considers
the multinationals’ activities globally, the empirical analysis is based
on a sample of 175 countries for which reliable information with regard
to corporate income taxation is available.
2. Another dimension that offers variation in the taxing conditions is the
time dimension. The panel data covers the multinationals’ activities
as well as the taxing conditions on an annual basis in the period from
1996 until 2005.
4Similarly, but based on a specific additional cost of debt function that does not distin-
guish between internal and external debt, Huizinga et al. (2008) suggest to use a weighted
average of all tax-rate differences within the group.
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3. The third dimension is related to the heterogeneity of the affiliates
that vary in the tax-rate difference relative to the lowest level of the
tax rate observed among all affiliates in the group. Note that this type
of variation refers to each individual affiliate in the dataset.
In order to test the empirical implications as outlined in the previous sec-
tion, we employ a micro-level dataset for German multinationals that is taken
from a comprehensive annual database of foreign direct investment positions
of German enterprises (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The
data provide information about each foreign affiliate’s balance sheet and some
further information about the ownership and about the German investor.
Each German multinational has to report its foreign assets, including both
directly and indirectly held FDI, if it is above some lower threshold level.5
Basically, the estimation sample comprises balance-sheet information of vir-
tually all German outbound investments from 1996 to 2005, regardless of the
degree of ownership.
With regard to the lending part of internal debt, the dataset distinguishes
internal debt received from the parent as well as internal debt received from
5Data collection is enforced by German law, which determines reporting mandates for
international transactions as part of the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation. Since
2002 FDI has to be reported if the participation is 10% or more and the balance-sheet
total of the foreign object is above 3 million euro. For details see Lipponer (2007). Though
previous years showed lower threshold levels, we apply this threshold level uniformly for
all years in the panel.
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other foreign affiliates.6 This allows us to restrict the focus of the empirical
analysis even more closely to internal loans granted as well as received by
foreign affiliates and to exclude internal loans by the German parent. This is
important, since, given the high German tax rates, under standard conditions
there is little reason to expect that German parents use internal loans to
foreign affiliates in order to shift foreign profits into Germany.7
As we focus on internal loans issued and received by foreign affiliates, we
implicitly assume that the taxing conditions for these foreign affiliates are
decisive for the multinational. This might be questioned in a context where
the parent company would have to pay taxes on worldwide profits, as in a
regime of foreign tax credit. However, note that for German multinationals
as well as for most other European multinationals the exemption principle
applies. Moreover, no interest allocation rules apply in Germany. Hence,
the German case might be much more straightforward as compared to the
U.S. case, where foreign earnings are taxed subject to a foreign tax credit
and, furthermore, interest allocation rules apply (see Altshuler and Mintz,
1995). Yet the exemption principle might not be fully effective in the German
case, for instance, due to Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules; we
will come back to this issue below.
6The corresponding position is “...liabilities to affiliated enterprises ... outside of Ger-
many” (see Lipponer, 2007).
7The German parent instead might borrow internally from foreign low-tax affiliates.
However, this information is not available in the dataset.
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Since taxing conditions vary in more than one dimension, we can further
exploit the micro-level structure of the dataset and explore the capital struc-
ture of multinationals using panel-data techniques. Following our discussion
of the empirical implications, the analysis is based on regressions of the fol-
lowing type
IDi,k,t = a1(τi,t − τmink,t ) + a2τi,t + a3xi,k,t + ϕt + γk + εi,k,t, (4.7)
where (τi,t−τmink,t ) is the affiliate-specific tax-rate difference with regard to the
lowest tax rate within the group, and τi,t is the statutory tax rate applicable
to affiliate i. The dependent variable, ID, is defined by the amount of internal
loans received by a foreign affiliate i from other foreign affiliates within the
multinational group k divided by total capital.
Note that the basic specification includes time effects, ϕt, possibly capturing
differences in the treatment of foreign earnings in the home country (Ger-
many) of the multinational and other aggregate shocks. The specification
also takes account of a specific effect for each multinational group, γk. This
is important in the current context since group-specific risk would affect the
lending rate and the additional cost of borrowing (Desai et al., 2004a). Us-
ing group-specific fixed effects also allows us to condition on the international
structure of each group. This is crucial since we exploit the differences in
the group structure in order to identify tax incentives but do not model the
choice of the group structure. We also employ affiliate-specific control vari-
ables, xk,i,t, which capture some heterogeneity in the borrowing costs across
affiliates. Since borrowing costs may vary across industries, we also pro-
vide results of specifications that employ industry-specific effects. Finally,
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borrowing costs might also be related to country-specific conditions in the
lending market such as bankruptcy laws, creditor rights, etc. This would
suggest to further include country-specific effects. However, the empirical
literature (Desai et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2008) usually does not employ
those effects, as they entirely remove the cross-sectional distribution.
4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 provides some information about the sample of multinationals. The
basic sample includes FDI in 175 countries held by German multinationals,
excluding all bi-national corporations with only one foreign affiliate where no
internal loans from non-German affiliates can be observed. Nevertheless, this
sample covers more than 90% of the total foreign FDI position of Germany.
Note that this basic sample is used to describe the profit-shifting incentives
for the multinationals. The distribution of internal debt that is empirically
investigated, however, is taken from the reduced sample excluding affiliates
with zero sales. While this restriction implies a reduction in the number
of observations, the idea is to focus on the capital structure of productive
affiliates as in the above theoretical model.8 Nevertheless, since the tax-
rate difference with regard to the lowest tax rate observed among all foreign
affiliates is determined using the basic sample, we take the tax incentives for
internal debt into account in a rather comprehensive way including purely
non-productive tax-haven affiliates.
8The estimation results proved to be robust against the inclusion of zero-sales affiliates.
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Table 4.1: Sample Characteristics
Sample Observations Countries Capital (in bn. e)
(1) Basic sample
excl. bi-national corp. 157,184 123.06 4,054
(2) Reduced sample
excl. zero sales 128,892 119.01 1,472
Capital consists of registered capital, capital reserves, profit reserves, as well as internal and external
debt. The total capital figure is an unweighted annual average for the period from 1996 to 2005. Sample
1 excludes bi-national corporations and comprises all foreign direct investment observations (outbound
investment) where corporate tax rate information is available; Sample 2 further excludes all observations
reporting no sales. Countries is the average number of countries in the sample where at least one German
investment is reported.
As has been discussed above, we employ affiliate- and group-specific indica-
tors of the tax incentives for profit shifting. More specifically, we proceed in
two steps. First, we determine for each multinational the lowest corporate
income tax rate observed among all of its foreign affiliates; for ease of exposi-
tion we will refer to the corresponding affiliate as the lowest-tax affiliate. In a
second step, we use this group-specific minimum tax rate as the benchmark
for the group and compute the tax-rate difference of the host country tax
rate with regard to this benchmark for each of the affiliates. As a conse-
quence, high-tax affiliates of a multinational will show large positive tax-rate
differences, whereas the tax-rate difference for the lowest-tax affiliate is zero.
Table 4.2 provides some information about which countries typically host the
lowest-tax affiliates. The second column lists the number of all affiliates re-
ported in each of the countries. The third column, denoted with ∆τ = 0, lists
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Table 4.2: Geographical Distribution of Affiliates
Country obs. ∆τ = 0 τ Country obs. ∆τ = 0 τ
Albania 11 0 0.273 Egypt 274 0 0.400
Algeria 47 12 0.324 El Salvador 48 9 0.250
Angola c) c) 0.375 Equitorial Guinea 0 0 0.250
Antigua & Barbuda c) c) 0.390 Estonia 160 28 0.258
Argentina 938 62 0.341 Ethiopia 4 0 0.425
Armenia c) c) 0.240 Faroe Islands 0 0 0.210
Aruba 0 0 0.350 Fiji 0 0 0.335
Australia 2,769 215 0.334 Finland 885 114 0.283
Austria 8,387 1,568 0.331 France 12,928 808 0.369
Azerbaijan 16 4 0.280 French Polynesia 0 0 0.450
Bahamas 18 18 0.000 Gabon 16 0 0.370
Bahrain 40 40 0.000 Gambia c) c) 0.350
Bangladesh 55 0 0.350 Georgia 10 7 0.200
Barbados 38 0 0.380 Ghana 23 7 0.333
Belarus 17 5 0.278 Gibraltar 37 0 0.350
Belgium 4,588 232 0.383 Greece 951 64 0.347
Belize c) c) 0.290 Greenland 0 0 0.350
Bermuda 210 210 0.000 Grenada 0 0 0.300
Bolivia 26 5 0.250 Guatemala 110 0 0.298
Botswana 0 0 0.250 Guernsey 36 6 0.200
Brazil 3,138 614 0.323 Guinea 0 0 0.350
British Virgin Isl. 94 43 0.135 Guyana 0 0 0.450
Brunei 13 0 0.300 Haiti c) c) 0.350
Bulgaria 309 83 0.293 Honduras 28 8 0.296
Cambodia c) c) 0.200 Hong Kong 2,117 1,339 0.165
Cameroon 19 0 0.385 Hungary 3,635 2,478 0.193
Canada 2,467 75 0.413 Iceland 16 0 0.258
Canary Isl. 10 7 0.350 India 1219 46 0.369
Cayman Isl. 589 589 0.000 Indonesia 548 72 0.300
Ceuta and Melilla 0 0 0.350 Iran 78 7 0.453
Chile 572 325 0.156 Ireland 1,760 1,475 0.108
China 3,703 286 0.330 Isle of Man 43 40 0.100
Columbia 341 0 0.350 Israel 179 7 0.358
Congo 10 0 0.440 Italy 7,752 107 0.423
Costa Rica 75 6 0.300 Jamaica 9 0 0.333
Coˆte d’Ivoire 43 0 0.350 Japan 2,667 14 0.453
Croatia 414 89 0.265 Jersey 75 7 0.200
Cyprus 358 80 0.215 Jordan 8 0 0.370
Czech Republic 4,792 1,055 0.326 Kazakhstan 44 5 0.300
Democra. Rep. of Congo 14 0 0.425 Kenya 83 0 0.318
Denmark 2,092 313 0.312 Korea (South) 1,056 178 0.299
Dominica c) c) 0.300 Kuwait 17 0 0.550
Dominican Republic 59 7 0.250 Kyrgyzstan 9 0 0.275
Ecuador 124 10 0.315 Latvia 153 76 0.221
obs.: total number of affiliates (pooled in the period from 1996 until 2005); ∆τ = 0: number of affiliates
with a tax-rate difference equal to zero, i.e number of observations identified as low-tax affiliates; τ :
average host country statutory tax rate; c) confidential data.
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Table 4.2: Geographical Distribution of Affiliates, cont.
Country obs. ∆τ = 0 τ Country obs. ∆τ = 0 τ
Lebanon 28 18 0.125 Senegal 11 0 0.344
Lesotho 0 0 0.360 Seychelles 0 0 0.400
Libya 50 0 0.460 Sierra Leone 0 0 0.429
Liechtenstein 68 43 0.200 Singapore 2,191 619 0.245
Lithuania 163 124 0.224 Slovak Rep. 1,164 365 0.306
Luxembourg 2,234 386 0.351 Slovenia 388 117 0.250
Macau 6 0 0.147 Solomon Isl. 0 0 0.320
Macedonia 33 26 0.150 South Africa 1,649 39 0.393
Malawi 7 0 0.363 Spain 7,478 554 0.350
Malaysia 1,094 225 0.284 Sri Lanka 59 11 0.355
Maldives 4 4 0.000 St Kitts & Nevis c) c) 0.381
Malta 96 11 0.350 St Lucia 0 0 0.332
Morocco 211 16 0.350 St Vincent c) c) 0.400
Mauritania 0 0 0.200 Sudan 0 0 0.494
Mauritius 52 4 0.300 Surinam 0 0 0.379
Mexico 1,849 107 0.339 Svalbard 0 0 0.280
Moldova 28 9 0.226 Swaziland 9 0 0.345
Mozambique 5 0 0.371 Sweden 2,784 716 0.280
Myanmar 6 6 0.300 Switzerland 7,851 4,750 0.245
Namibia 12 8 0.350 Syria 0 0 0.470
Nepal c) c) 0.250 Taiwan 620 84 0.250
Netherlands 8,661 1,114 0.345 Tanzania 22 0 0.310
Netherlands Antilles 121 5 0.363 Thailand 735 105 0.300
New Caledonia 5 0 0.300 Trinidad & Tobago 34 0 0.335
New Zealand 449 11 0.330 Tunisia 103 15 0.346
Nicaragua 23 0 0.285 Turkey 1,245 94 0.360
Nigeria 91 16 0.300 Turks & Caicos Isl. 0 0 0.000
Northern Mariana Isl. 0 0 0.350 Uganda 18 0 0.300
Norway 1,190 298 0.280 Ukraine 246 22 0.290
Oman 23 15 0.250 United Arab. Emir. 103 8 0.333
Pakistan 160 7 0.356 United Kingdom 13,145 3,834 0.307
Panama 97 0 0.342 Uruguay 167 39 0.310
Papua New Guinea 0 0 0.265 US Virgin Isl. 0 0 0.385
Paraguay 41 17 0.300 USA 16,775 1,636 0.412
Peru 196 13 0.294 Uzbekistan 4 0 0.275
Philippines 364 16 0.329 Vanuatu 0 0 0.000
Poland 5,198 2,165 0.299 Venezuela 312 22 0.340
Portugal 1,922 370 0.319 Vietnam 79 0 0.310
Qatar 4 0 0.350 West Bank/Gaza c) c) 0.200
Romania 645 215 0.293 Yemen c) c) 0.345
Russia 1,165 305 0.301 Yugoslavia 96 39 0.203
Rwanda 0 0 0.350 Zambia 6 0 0.350
Samoa 0 0 0.346 Zimbabwe 21 0 0.338
Saudi Arabia 165 13 0.355 All Countries 157,155 31,491 .302
obs.: total number of affiliates (pooled in the period from 1996 until 2005); ∆τ = 0: number of affiliates
with a tax-rate difference equal to zero, i.e number of observations identified as low-tax affiliates; τ :
average host country statutory tax rate. c) confidential data.
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the number of observations where the respective country hosts the lowest-tax
affiliate. Reflecting the importance of these countries’ export markets for the
German multinationals, most affiliates are reported in the U.S., in the U.K.,
in France, and in the Netherlands. But, the table also shows that if an affili-
ate is located in a tax haven such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Bahrain, or
Bahamas, it is always the lowest-tax affiliate in the group.
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Statutory tax rate .330 .073 0 .600
Tax-rate difference .121 .102 0 .550
Tax-rate difference with CFC rulesa) .055 .050 0 .300
Total leverage .586 .274 0 1
Internal debt
– total .241 .260 0 1
– excluding loans
from German parent (ID) .106 .196 0 1
Loss carry-forward .309 .462 0 1
Tangibility .261 .254 0 1
ln(Sales) 9.82 1.43 b) b)
Panel comprises 10 years, 128,892 (a) 107,238) observations. The tax-rate difference is the difference
between the statutory tax rate at the affiliate’s location and the minimum tax rate within the multinational
group. a) additionally takes the German CFC rules into account (see Section 4.6.1). b) confidential data.
Table 4.3 displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical
analysis. While the tax-rate variable is measured at the level of the host
country, all other variables including the tax-rate difference vary by affiliate.
A first impression of the relative importance of internal debt as a means of
shifting taxable profits, as compared to the standard tax shelter from debt,
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is given by the three different borrowing variables. While the total leverage
is almost 60%, internal debt makes up only a capital share of 24.1%. This
figure still includes internal loans from the German parent to foreign affiliates.
Given Germany’s high tax rate, it is quite unlikely that these loans are related
to profit shifting. Internal loans received from other foreign affiliates amount
only to an average capital share of 10.6%. Yet this share is possibly highly
sensitive to taxing conditions.
Table 4.4: Leverage and Internal debt
basic
sample
multinationals with an
affiliate in a low-tax country
lowest-tax
affiliates
10%-percentile 5%-percentile ∆τ = 0
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total leverage .586 .551 .547 .548
External debt .344 .301 .307 .342
Internal debt
– total .241 .250 .240 .205
– excluding loans
from German parent .106 .149 .162 .078
Observations 128,892 57,049 31,919 31,521
10 % percentile (5%-percentile): all groups with an affiliate located in one of the low-tax countries, where
a low-tax country is defined as a country with a statutory tax rate below the 10% (5%) percentile; ∆τ = 0
refers to all those foreign affiliates with the lowest tax rate within the group.
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4.6 Results
Table 4.4 provides some first descriptive evidence for the impact of taxes
on internal debt. It displays the share of capital financed with different
kinds of debt for the basic sample as well as for various sub-samples. For
ease of comparison, Column (1) repeats the mean figures reported above.
Columns (2) and (3) report the share of internal debt observed among the
affiliates of those multinational corporations that hold at least one affiliate
in a low-tax country. Column (2) defines the low-tax country as a country
with a tax rate below the 10% percentile of the tax-rate distribution among
the countries, Column (3) uses the even stricter definition based on the 5%
percentile of the tax-rate distribution. If corporations use internal debt for
profit shifting, we should expect the mean to be higher for the affiliates of
these multinational corporations. Indeed, the capital share of internal debt
(excluding loans obtained from the German parent) is higher by a factor of 1.4
to 1.5, indicating that the use of internal debt is much more prevalent among
multinationals with affiliates in low-tax countries. Conversely, the affiliate
experiencing the lowest tax rate within the group should display a much
lower capital share of internal debt. As reported in Column (4), the mean
capital share for those affiliates is only three quarters of the overall mean.
This further confirms the theoretical view, which predicts that internal debt
is small as there are few incentives to shift profits out of low-tax countries.
Table 4.5 reports regression results for a basic specification following Equa-
tion (4.7). In order to control for the group structure and group-specific
Chapter 4 – Internal Debt and Multinationals’ Tax Planning 126
risks, all estimations employ fixed effects for the company group. Moreover,
time dummies are included in order to capture differences in the taxation of
the parent. The standard errors are computed taking account of a potential
problem with grouped error terms. Following Bertrand et al. (2004) we clus-
ter at the level of the year-country cells, since the statutory tax rate only
varies across these cells. Given the limited information in the balance sheet
of the affiliates, only three affiliate-level control variables are included. Since
the effective tax reduction from using debt might be zero if an affiliate carries
forward any losses for tax purposes (see MacKie-Mason, 1990), we include a
variable indicating whether a loss carry-forward is reported. We also include
the sales of the affiliate, because a larger cash flow might be associated with
less credit-market constraints, and hence, might facilitate access to external
credit that replaces internal debt. Finally, tangibility, defined as the ratio of
fixed assets to total assets, is used as a further determinant of the financial
structure.9
Throughout most specifications, the tax-rate difference shows a significant
positive effect, whereas the host country tax rate proves insignificant. This
confirms the theoretical prediction in the sense that corporations use internal
debt to shift taxable profits. At the same time, the insignificance of the tax
rate indicates that internal loans between foreign affiliates do not play an
important role in minimizing the cost of capital. Given the magnitude of the
9Higher tangibility, on the one hand, is associated with an easier access to additional
debt because firms can easily borrow against fixed assets. Agency costs of debt are then
reduced by the value of collateral. On the other hand, the value of interest deduction may
be crowded out by the non-debt tax shields generated by depreciation and investment tax
credits related to tangible assets (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).
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other types of debt (cf. Table 4.3), this function might well be carried out by
loans from the German parent or by external debt.
Qualitatively, there is not much difference between specifications. Column
(4) includes a control for a loss carry-forward as the incentive to save taxes is
reduced in this case. The positive sign might reflect the support of financially
weaker firms by means of internal loans (Gopalan et al., 2007). According to
Columns (5) and (6), the results prove robust also against the inclusion of
controls for sales and tangibility. The specification in Column (7) additionally
employs industry-level dummies using a classification of affiliates according
to 71 industries. This might help to further control for differences in the
financial risk related to an affiliate’s activities. Column (8) uses controls for
the host country in order to make sure that no country-specific characteristics
are driving the results. While the results prove to be robust, one might,
however, be concerned that some part of the variation is swallowed up by
the country-specific dummies.
Quantitatively, we see from the preferred Specification (7) that a ten percent-
age point increase in the tax-rate difference with regard to the group-specific
lowest-tax affiliate leads to an approximately 0.73 percentage point higher
internal-debt ratio. Expressed as a semi-elasticity, an increase of the tax-rate
difference by ten percentage points triggers a response in the corresponding
capital share by 6.9%. This figure is within the range of existing estimates of
the tax sensitivity of multinationals’ debt. Corresponding calculations based
on the estimates by Desai et al. (2004a) yield a semi-elasticity of 10.2%
(5.5%) for the sensitivity of an affiliate’s capital share of internal (external)
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debt with regard to the tax rate. Huizinga et al. (2007), employing a tax-rate
difference variable in order to predict the total debt-to-asset ratio of foreign
affiliates, report weaker effects that point at semi-elasticities of approx. 2.1%
or lower, depending on the size of the affiliate.10
The rather small tax effects suggest that there are some important costs or
restrictions which prevent corporations from heavily using internal debt for
profit shifting. For instance, host countries may enact specific policies that
restrict the use of internal debt for tax-planning purposes. In particular,
withholding taxes on interest payments or thin-capitalization rules come to
mind. While it proved impossible to augment the current analysis based on
175 countries with information about those rules, Huizinga et al. (2008) note
that withholding taxes on interest payments are mainly zero within Europe,
where most of the foreign direct investment of German multinationals is
located. Therefore, it seems unlikely that withholding taxes can explain the
low tax sensitivity. With regard to thin-capitalization rules, we should note
that the current analysis is only concerned with internal loans received from
other foreign affiliates. Thin-capitalization rules would, however, also refer
to related-party debt that is issued by the parent. Given that the share of
internal debt owed to the parent is 13.5% as compared to 10.6% for the share
of debt related to other foreign affiliates, in many cases foreign affiliates could
lower the amount of debt owed to the parent in order to avoid the denial of
interest deduction. If foreign affiliates are hesitant to do so, we are back
to the question of what prevents foreign affiliates to rearrange the capital
10Since Huizinga et al. (2008) use a weighted average of bilateral tax-rate differences,
one obtains even smaller effects when taking into account a weighting factor smaller than 1.
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structure accordingly. However, not only host countries’ tax policies but also
the tax policy in the parent country might affect the tax incentive for the
shifting of taxable profits within the multinational if the exemption of foreign
profits is limited.
4.6.1 Taking Account of CFC Rules
While we have focused on internal debt of firms where we observe positive
sales, some affiliates’ income may be defined as passive income according
to Germany’s controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules.11 Passive income
comprises, for example, royalties, dividends, or interest earnings. Indeed,
our model implies that low-tax affiliates earn interest income. German tax
authorities, however, grant full tax exemption of an affiliate’s earnings only
if they stem from active business operations. In particular, if interest income
of the low-tax affiliate is not reinvested it might be classified as passive in-
come under this rule.12 If the affiliate’s income is defined as passive income
and the host country tax level is below 30% (since 2001, 25%), income is
immediately taxable in Germany; even if it is not repatriated (Hinzurech-
nungsbesteuerung, see 10, AStG). To take account of a possible impact of
the CFC rules, we change the computation of the tax-rate difference with
regard to the lowest-tax affiliate within the group and consider only tax-rate
11Sec.7–Sec.14 Außensteuergesetz (AStG, International Transactions Tax Act). Accord-
ingly, the US legislation refers to Subpart F rules.
12The German legislation explicitly defines income which is accepted as active income
(8 AStG).
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differences with regard to host countries with a tax rate above 30% (25%).
The resulting tax-rate difference is, as expected, much smaller, and shows
a mean of 5.5% – compared with the previous figure of 12.1% (see Table
4.3). The empirical results obtained with this modified tax–rate difference
are depicted in Table 4.6.
While the number of observations is reduced slightly, the results are qualita-
tively quite similar to the basic results presented above. Again, the statutory
tax rate does not prove significant. Only the tax-rate difference exerts a pos-
itive impact, with a coefficient that is quite similar to the basic findings
(0.08 instead of 0.073). Also the semi-elasticity is only 7.4% compared to
6.9%. This indicates that the low tax sensitivity of internal debt cannot be
attributed to CFC rules.13
Besides CFC rules, another possible tax issue is the taxation of repatriated
foreign profits. As noted above, Germany generally follows the exemption
principle: as of 1996, at the beginning of the period analyzed, this is docu-
mented by 72 double-taxation treaties covering all the major host countries
for German FDI (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2008). These treaties apply to
about 80% of the observations in the basic sample and to an even larger
share of the affiliates with positive sales that constitute the estimation sam-
ple. Nevertheless, a significant share of low-tax countries do not have double-
taxation treaties with Germany such that the German parent does not enjoy
tax exemption. However, this group of countries largely overlaps with the
13This fits with some recent literature arguing that the US’s anti-abuse controlled foreign
corporation (CFC) provisions are not effective (e.g., Mutti and Grubert, 2006).
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countries that are subject to the above CFC rules. Therefore, also the lack
of double-taxation treaties cannot explain the low tax sensitivity.
4.6.2 Majority-Owned Subsidiaries
Another possible explanation of why firms experience high costs when ad-
justing the capital structure is related to the additional cost of using internal
debt. While additional costs of debt are not directly observed in the dataset,
some of their potential determinants are. Desai et al. (2004b) argue that
shared ownership of foreign affiliates is associated with coordination costs
which impede tax-efficient structuring of worldwide operations. This view
is supported by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), who find a higher tax-rate
sensitivity of internal debt for wholly-owned subsidiaries. In terms of the
above theoretical framework, this would imply that the additional costs of
borrowing related to internal debt are lower and exhibit a smaller gradient
when the ownership share is higher. Hence, we might expect an affiliate to
use more internal debt and to display a higher tax sensitivity of internal debt
if the ownership share of the parent is higher.
Since not only the level of internal debt will be different with a higher degree
of ownership but also the sensitivity with regard to the tax-rate differential
and all other determinants of internal debt, Table 4.7 reports results for a
sample where only majority-owned subsidiaries are included. In fact, the tax
sensitivity is positive and larger as compared to the results in Tables 4.5 and
4.6. Taking the results from Specification (6), we find that the coefficient of
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the tax-rate differential is about 0.095 for majority-owned subsidiaries. This
indicates that a ten percentage point increase in the tax-rate difference with
regard to the lowest-tax affiliate leads to an approximately 0.95 percentage
point higher internal-debt ratio. Expressed as a semi-elasticity evaluated at
the mean for majority-owned subsidiaries, a tax-rate change by ten percent-
age points triggers a response in the corresponding debt ratio by about 8.3%
– which is only slightly higher than the basic result above (6.9%).
4.7 Conclusions
We have set up a model of a multinational corporation that uses internal
debt for two purposes. The first is to minimize cost of capital by issuing
external debt in countries where financial conditions are favorable and trans-
ferring the funds via internal loans. The second is to shift taxable profits
to low-tax jurisdictions. The theoretical analysis suggests that – due to the
first purpose – the use of internal debt will be affected by the host country’s
statutory corporation tax rate. The second purpose, however, causes inter-
nal debt to depend on the tax-rate differential between the lending and the
borrowing firms within the multinational group. Only this latter relationship
is indicative of profit shifting. Therefore, existing empirical evidence on the
tax-rate sensitivity of the multinational capital structure even if related to
internal debt does not reveal its role for the shifting of taxable profits.
Our empirical investigation provides direct evidence on whether and to what
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extent internal debt is used for tax-planning purposes. The analysis makes
use of a large micro-level panel dataset of virtually all German multinationals
made available for research by the German Central Bank. A special feature
of this dataset is that it includes information about the actual amounts of
internal debt used by the foreign affiliates, distinguished into loans from the
parent and loans received from other foreign affiliates. This comprehensive
dataset allows us to exploit differences in the taxing conditions in 175 coun-
tries, including many low-tax countries, over a period of ten years. For each
affiliate within the multinational group, we calculate the appropriate tax-rate
difference relative to the lowest tax rate observed among all foreign affiliates
and use this to predict the amount of internal debt.
The empirical results confirm a robust and significant positive impact of tax-
rate differences within the multinational group on the use of internal debt,
supporting the view that internal debt is used to shift taxable profits to
low-tax countries. The host country tax rate proves insignificant, however,
suggesting that internal debt is not used to minimize the cost of capital.
Nevertheless, our findings indicate that the magnitude of tax effects is rather
small. Further analysis shows that the low tax sensitivity is not caused by
the German CFC rules. While an analysis focusing on majority-owned sub-
sidiaries points at slightly larger effects, the tax sensitivity remains modest.
To conclude, our findings are indicative of substantial costs of adjusting the
multinational’s capital structure for means of profit shifting. As a conse-
quence, if profit shifting is important, as the literature indicates, multination-
als seem to take resort to alternative strategies of tax planning. Moreover, the
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results suggest that restrictions imposed by tax policy on the capital struc-
ture of multinationals would not substantially curb the shifting of taxable
profits but would rather result in higher cost of capital.
Datasources and Definitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset of the Bundesbank,
see Lipponer (2007), for an overview. The dependent variable, ID, is
determined by a balance-sheet position capturing liabilities of foreign
affiliates to other foreign affiliates within the multinational group di-
vided by the affiliate’s total stock of capital. The latter is defined as
the sum of registered capital, capital reserves, profit reserves, as well
as internal and external debt.
Corporate taxation data are taken from the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation, and from surveys provided by the tax advisory compa-
nies Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG. The statutory tax rate variable
contains statutory profit tax rates modified by applicable restrictions
on interest deductions. The data covers a group of 175 countries in a
period of ten years from 1996 until 2005.
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